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A B S T R A C T :
Postwar era witnessed profound changes, such as the rapid dissolution of the 
Grand Alliance , an accelerated move towards a bipolar world order. As the leader of the 
“free” world countries, the U.S. launched a tripartite “free” world recovery program: the 
Greek- Turkish Aid Program, as the first appeal of the U.S. against totalitarianism; the 
European Recovery Program, a joint effort to make Europe again a self- sufficient and 
viable economic power; The Technical Assistance Program, to improve the conditions in 
underdeveloped regions.
Turkey participated in this joint effort. However, due to its backwardness as a 
participating country, it had a development program. After diagnosing the Turkish 
situation the U.S. and Turkish policy makers determined highway improvement and 
agricultural mechanization as high priority programs, since these would best serve to the 
objectives of the recovery program and contribute to Turkey’s integration to world 
economy. However, various reasons effected programs’ implementation, repercussions of 
which shattered Turkish society.
Ö Z E T ;
II. Dünya Savaşı sonrası dönem Bü)âik İttifakın hızla dağılması; iki kutuplu 
dünya düzenine doğru olan eğilimin ivme kazanması, gibi bü)nik değişikliklere neden 
olmuştur. Bu süreçte, özgür dünya ülkenin lideri olarak A.B.D üçlü bir “iyileşme” 
programı başlatmıştır; totalitarizme karşı ilk global teşebbüs olarak Yunan- Türk Yardım 
Programı; Avrupayı yeniden kendine yeten bir ekonomik güç yapmaya yönelik ortak bir 
çaba olarak Avmpa İyileşme Programı ; az gelişmiş bölgelerin mevcut şartlannı 
geliştirmeye yönelik Teknik Yardım Programı.
Türkiye bu ortak çabada yer almış ülkelerden birisidir. Diğer katılımcı 
ülkelerin (Yunanistan dışında) yeniden yapılanma programlarının aksine gerikalmış 
katılımcı bir ülke olarak Türkiye kalkınma programlarını benimsemiştir. Mevcut durumu 
tespit eden Amerikalı ve Türk politika karar vericileri, “özgür” dünya iyileştirme 
programının temel hedeflerine, ve Türkiye’nin dünya ekonomisine entegrasyonuna en 
fazla hizmet edebilecek programlar olarak karayolu yapımı ve tarımda makinalaşmayı 
öncelikli kalkınma projeleri olarak belirlemişlerdir. Ancak çeşitli nedenlerden dolayı bu 
projelerin uygulanmasını etkilemiştir. Bu programların , doğrudan ya da dolaylı, etkileri 
Türk toplumunu derinden sarsmıştır.
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I N T R 0_D_U_CT I  O N
The U.S. entered the postwar era in a uniquely strong position, due to its 
economic and military strength and technological facilities. The postwar era 
however did not bring peace.' Prevailing postwar realities , like physical 
destruction, economic dislocation, disparity in production and trade, the dollar 
gap and adaptation of protectionist economic policies, were the main obstacles for 
the attainment of peace. The survivors of the WWII desired a better future; 
however, the reconstruction process would be ‘painful and disillusioning’.^
The rapid polarization of the world into two opposing ideologies 
aggravated the situation. With the attainment of victory, the chief bond that had 
held the Grand Alliance together was dissolved, and Central Europe remained in 
the middle of a power vacuum with “increasingly suspicious super powers glaring 
at each other from opposite sides of it.”  ^Although there were some non- alligned 
countries, many survivors chose their “places” either in a “free” US- led orbit, or a 
communist U.S.S.R.-led orbit.
After diagnosing these prevailing problems, U.S. policy makers endeavored 
to establish a new world order that would promote world peace and foster
' Dean Acheson, ‘Credit to Britain and World Trade’ U.S. Department o f State Bulletin, Vol. XIV, 
March 3,1946, No. 348
 ^ Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance o f Power; National Security, the Truman Administration and 
the Cold War,California: Stanford University Press, 1992 ,p.l
 ^John Gaddis, The U.S. and the End of Cold War, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 23
international stability “through the development of a global free market that 
intended to break down the autarchic trading blocs which had prevailed before 
the war”. At the same time, this new order would safeguard U.S. national security, 
perpetuate U.S. power, and extend U.S. prosperity.
U.S. officials stressed that nations could not become powerful unless “they 
had adequate supplies of mechanical energy; raw materials for basic industries; 
skilled technicians; experienced managers; and a social structure accustomed to 
producing surpluses beyond consumption for military purposes”.'’ Through the 
“free” world recovery program, the Truman administration sought to expand 
civilian consumption throughout the non- communist world. The basic 
components of this recovery program were the Truman Doctrine, the first global 
appeal that U.S. would stand against totalitarian regimes; European Recovery 
Program, a joint effort to make Europe again a self- sufficient, and viable 
economic power, and the Point Four, the technical assistance program to improve 
the conditions in underdeveloped areas, and make them a part of the “ free” 
world.
Through an increase in production; expansion of foreign trade; 
development of economic cooperation; and elimination of restrictive trade 
policies these postwar era development programs would provide economic 
stability and a stable international order. The degree of the program’s success, 
measured by the criteria of high productivity and the attainment of liberal
 ^ Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold 
War, p.3 
Mbid., p .l2
economic policies, varied in accordance to the industrialization level of the 
participating countries. The highly industrialized countries were successful in 
achieving these goals. For them WWII was a phenomenon that disturbed the 
ongoing political- economic system. Their postwar situation was merely a 
temporary condition, and their participation in the various recovery programs 
provided the momentum to increase productivity and exports and develop more 
liberal economic policies.*”
In contrast to the participating industrialized nations, Turkey was a young 
developing republic with a quite different economic structure. During the war 
years Turkey had prepared its postwar era plans based on the assumption that it 
continued its war time neutrality in the post war era. Later Turkish officials 
realized not only the impossibility of neutrality but Turkey’s obligatory place in the 
U.S.- led “free” world. When Turkey became a participating country in the “free” 
world recovery program, the U.S. aid allocations to Turkey were justified as 
support for the creation of a more developed and strong economy in a vitally 
strategic area.
With its backward economy, that was too weak to bear the burden of high 
industrialization, and low literate population the country lacked certain structural 
prerequisites. After diagnosing their problems, Turkish officials determined that 
highway improvement and agricultural mechanization would be their two high- 
priority programs. Highway improvement would provide the ultimate means to 
integrate the country’s internal market and end the isolation of its citizens.
'’Angus Maddison, Phases o f Capitalist Development, N.Y: Oxford University Press, 1982, p.l28
Agricultural mechanization would end the primitive, weather- dependent labor- 
intensive, agricultural practice, thereby increasing production levels. These 
officials, along with the planning staff in the U.S. State Department, agreed that 
the two programs would serve both the short-term goal of a rise in agricultural 
productivity to supply the necessary food requirements to Western Europe, and 
the long- term goal of Turkish economic expansion and capital accumulation 
through increased agricultural exports.
Turkish economic policy would be transformed from import- substitution, a 
protectionist and nationalistic policy which stressed the need for domestic 
production of key industrial goods, into a more liberal, outward oriented policy 
stressing the production of goods for export.^ The ultimate aim was a more liberal 
economic system which would increase Turkey’s potential as a market for U.S. 
goods and services and help to integrate Turkey into the U.S.- led “free” world 
economic system. ®
The Turkish experience within the context of the ’’free” world recovery 
program was partially successful, in that the short-term goal of an increase in 
agricultural production was achieved. However, Turkey did not realize the long 
term goal of economic transformation. The joint projects of highway development 
and agricultural mechanization, which had seemed so perfect in theory, bred 
many unexpected consequences. Through short-sighted calculations that failed to
’ Mustafa Sanli, Gelişmekte Olan Ülkelerde Liberal Ekonomiye Etkin Gecis Somnu: Güney Kore, 
Brezilya & Türkiye Deneyimleri, Unpublished Ph.D., Ankara: H.U., Sosyal Bilimler Enstitusi,1991, 
p.24,45
“ Harry Truman Library, President’s Secretary’s Files. Subject File, Box no. 189, Folder: Turkey- 
PSF Subject File, 22 December 1948.
consider social dimensions and a lack of skilled workers and administrators, these 
two programs , instead of facilitating Turkey’s integration into the world 
economy, shattered the social fabric of the country.®
' Z.Y. Hershlag, Turkey: An Economy In Transition, the Hague: Von Keylen, 1958
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Postwar Europe. In the postwar world nations faced new, greater problems 
than they had ever faced before. They were suffering from the terrible after effects 
of WWII’“, in which 50 million people had died through battlefield casualities , 
genocide, epidemics, and starvation , and heavy bombing had destroyed urban 
centers resulting in an unprecedented scale of devastation."
The artificial separation of the continent into isolated economic units of 
“western” and “eastern” Europe was a major problem. Since the end of the war. 
Eastern and Western Europe had been divorced both politically and economically 
from each other, a separation that was illogical from a liberal economic 
viewpoint.'^ Before the war, Europe was standing as a strong and constructive 
element of the world’s economic and political order in which the various parts 
complemented each o th e r . I t s  trade, both within Europe and with other regions.
'"The relevant literature includes Harry P. Price, The Marshall Plan & Its Meaning, Ithaca, 
N.Y:1955; Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain & the Reconstrucdon of Western 
Europe, 1947-52, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987; Walter LaFeber, America, Russia & 
the Cold War, 1945-80, N.Y: John Waley & Sons, 1980; Melvyn Lefller, A Preponderance o f Power: 
National Security, the Truman Administration 8c. the Cold War, California: Stanford University, 
1992.
"Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold 
War, p.l
J.K Galbaith, ’America and Western Europe’, Papers o f Paul G. Hoffman, Box 24, Folder: 
Publication 3 
ibid.
was a m ^or factor in the international exchange of commodities and services and 
was a direct stimulus to productivity throughout the world
This separation into East and West caused a European crisis. This was not 
an ordinary economic problem but a much profounder problem.'^ In 1947 there 
were signs of the first approaching crisis since the turn in the tide of the war.'*’ 
This crisis originated in England, France and Germany, the most important 
European economic centers which by 1938 had a market three times as large as 
the U.S. and produced more than two- fifth of the world’s imports of 
manufactured goods.” For this reason, the crisis had an international significance 
beyond the concern of the individual nations.'®
In the war stricken countries there were almost no transportation systems , 
except those of the armies. This prevailing reality restricted the ability to move 
goods and people. Europeans were unable to get the food and raw materials 
required to produce the exports necessary to get purchasing power for food and 
raw materials.·" The war also destroyed merchant fleets, thus cutting off the
Committee Press Releases, Confidential, November 18, 1947. Papers o f Dean Acheson. Political 
and Governmental File, Marshall Plan Talks , Box No. 4, Folder: Marshall Plan
Oral History Interview witli Milton Katz, U.S. Special Representative in Europe with Rank of 
Ambassador, July 25, 1975, p. 23, HTR.
Papers o f Joseph M. Jones, Box 2, Folder: Truman Doctrine, 26 February 1947, HTR.
S. K. Varvaresso, ‘Memo of the Prospects of European Recovery Under the Marshall Plan’, 9 
February 1948. Papers o f Dean Ache.son, Political and Governmental File, Box 5, Folder: Marshall 
Plan Reports, ERP 1948, HTR.
Ibid.
'”Oral History Interview with Milton Katz, U.S. Special Representative in Europe with Rank o f  
Ambassador, July 25,1975, p. 23, HTR.
George Marshall,’ Assistance to European Economic Recovery’17.08.97epartment o f State 
Bulletin, Vol. XVIII January 8, 1948,HTR..
accustomed income from carrying the world’s goods. This destroyed business 
relationships, markets and sources of raw materials.·'
By 1947 the most serious problem was the food crisis.^  ^Western Europe was 
heavily dependent on grain imports for both human consumption and livestock 
feed. Before the war, imports averaged over 22,000,000 tons/ year. The postwar 
recovery in agricultural production had been uneven and incomplete. Adverse 
weather conditions in 1947 reduced Western European crops to five million tons 
below their 1946 levels.^  ^It was said that the wheat crop in France was the smallest 
since the days of Napoleon.^^ Other factors that precipitated the food shortage 
included the seizure of all available food supplies by the Axis countries; the lack of 
fertilizers, pesticidies or seeds; the theft and destruction of food machinery; the 
mass killing of the draft animals essential for small scale agriculture during the 
war; and the manpower shortage.^'’
While the postwar level of agricultural production in Western Europe had 
dropped 20- 25% below 1938 levels ( Table 1), by 1947 the population had 
increased by 17 million (Table 2).^ *’ The consumption of foodstuffs was only 80% 
or less than prewar levels. The situation was so dramatic that President Truman 
made several attempts to appeal to Americans, urging them to eat less chicken.
Ibid.
Galbaith, ,’America and Western Europe’, Papers of Paul G. Hoffman, Box 24, Folder: 
Publication 3,HTR.
Report o f the Committee on Foreign Aid, Department o f State Bulledn, Vol XVII, October 5, 
1947.
Oral History Interview with John Hickerson, Director For European Affairs, 10 November 1972, 
HTR.
Address o f Herbert Lehman, First Director o f UNRRA, 12 October 1947. Papers o f Dean 
Acheson, Political and Government File, Marshall Plan Talks, Box. No. 4 Folder: Committee Press 
Releases,HTR.
fewer eggs or conserve ‘a slice of bread’ so there would be food for starving 
Europeans.^^
TABLE..NOl: PRODUCTION OF BREAD GRAINS_ IN_J:RP ХОЛЫТШЕЗ;. TREWAR/
POSTWAR/ PLANNED (1000 TONS)
COUNTRY PREWAR_. _T9.47 ____ __1948.......... 1949_____ ____195.2
Austria 869 485 555 615 900
Beneleux 1836 826 1239 1357 1427
Denmark 645 345 630 660 700
France 9007 3686 8072 8603 10800
Greece 822 619 810 881 1135
Ireland 178 318 376 320 180
Italy 7389 4771 6299 6725 7630
Sweden 1105 542 863 950 1050
Turkey 4184 3352 4750 5300 6340
U.K. 1687 1716 2369 2548 2764    
SOURCES: From programs submitted by participating countries through OEEC^*
TABLE N02:POPULATTON F.STTMATF.S FOR F.RP COUNTRIES : 1952-5.3-COMPARED WITH 
WAR (Millions)
GOUNTRIES_
PREWAR
_EOJBIILATLON JL952-_5.a
1952-53 POPULATION 
OF POJPJJLA'nOJiABA& INCREASE
Beneleux 17.2 19.5 13.3
Denmark 3.7 4.3 17.3
France* 41.9 43.6 5.8
Greece 7.0 8.3 18.1
Italy 43.0 47.6 10.7
Norway 2.9 3.3 13.1
Switzerland 4.2 4.8 15.3
Turkey 16.6 20.4 22.9
U.K 47.2 51.0 8.0
*Excluding prewar , including Saar for 1952-53 /  SOURCES: Data
submitted to OEEC^ ^
The coal shortage was another problem of the
accentuated during the severe winter of 1946 and continued through 1947.^“ The 
main reason for this was the destruction of mining facilities of the Ruhrland
Harry B. Price, The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955,p. 30 p. 
223
Evan Thomas, T he Man and the Plan’ Newsweek, Special Report, 26 May 1997, Vol. CXXIX, No. 
21, p. 15. 
ibid., p .l4
® RG 286 Records o f the AID, Confidential. Box No.11, Folder: Food and Agriculture Exports, 
January 1949, p.2, NARA. 
ibid., p. 30
during WWII. As a primary commodity in every European economy its shortage 
deeply affected industrial production in Western Europe. By 1947 the industrial 
output of Western Europe was 15 to 20 % less than it had been in 1938.^’ In 1947 
London had fuel only to heat and light homes for a few hours per day. Graffiti in 
the bombed out Reichstag, “Blessed are the dead, for their hands did not freeze” , 
reflected the critical situation and helplessness of Europeans.^^
The combined deficiencies of transportation, food , and coal served as a 
means of fostering supporters of Communism in Europe, a factor which caused 
anxiety among American officials. Communism had an upward momentum in 
Europe since 1939, particularly in the defeated Axis countries, where the Kremlin 
was seen as liberator, and Communist leaders as heroes.^^
The increasing membership of the Communist party gives some idea of this 
tendency: the Belgian Communist Party grew from 9,000 in 1939 to 100,000 in 
November 1945; in Holland from 10,000 in 1938 to 53,000 in 1946; in Greece 
from 17,000 in 1935 to 70,000 in 1945; in Italy from 5,000 in 1943 to 1,700,000 at 
the end of 1945; in Czechoslovakia from 28,000 in May 1945 to 75,0000 in 
September 1945. In Italy, France and Finland the Communist vote was already 
20% of the electorate in 1945. ^
The experiences of the war and the problems of the postwar era taught 
people the necessity of making more efficient use of economic resources and
ibid, p. 223
Thomas, ‘The Man & the Plan’ Newsweek, Special Report, May 26 ,1997, v. CXXIX, No 21, p. 12 
Leffler, A Preponderance o f Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold 
War, p. 7 
ibid.
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elimination of waste. ’^In line with this reasoning the European nations inclined 
toward economic nationalism. They adopted preferential tariff systems, favoritism 
in the allocation of import quotas or the use of exchange controls to the 
disadvantage of certain foreign countries; and denial of access to trade or raw 
materials.®'" These protectionist policies led the key countries of the region to sign 
bilateral treaties among themselves and implement other restrictive measures to 
lower imports.®  ^ In 1947, nearly two thirds of Western Europe’s trade was 
organized bilaterally , particularly through exchange controls , quantitative 
restrictions, and barter arrangements. ®®
For the survival of their citizens, the Western European countries had to 
import almost entirely all basic foodstuffs, industrial materials, and equipment. 
Under this pressure to import needed supplies, European foreign exchange 
reserves dwindled rapidly, and many countries were forced to restrict their foreign 
purchases to bare essentials.®® Unavoidable importation of needed commodities 
and limited amount of European exportation to the U.S. caused a disequlibirium 
in the balance of payments. This disequlibirium was not a novelty of the postwar 
era; however the scope of this disequlibirium since the end of WWII became 
extreme. From July 1,1945 to July 31, 1948, U.S. exports to Western Europe *
Report prepared by Donald Stone, Director o f Administration, MSA , 7 August 1952.. RG 286 
Records of the AID. Subject Files, Box No,. 11, Folder: Deputy Director’s Staff Meetings, NARA.
“ William Clayton, ‘Importance o f International Economic Relations to the World Peace’, U.S. 
Department o f the State Bulletin, Vol. XIV, 21 April 1946,
”  Robert Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins o f the Cold War, 1945-50; N.Y: Colombia 
University, 1985, p. 133.
** LefiQer, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold 
War, p.8
ERP Basic Document No. 1, Confidential. Papers o f Clark M. Clifford. B File, Box 6, p. 8,HTR.
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totaled $ 34.7 billion, while imports from Europe amounted to only $ 16.2 billion, 
a surplus of $18.5 billion.“*"
The growing deficits in their balance of payments fostered a significant 
problem in Western European countries, known as the dollar gap. This gap hred 
financial, monetary, and political instability, which could only be overcome when 
European countries began to produce enough for their own needs, and “ they 
could defray the cost of imports by self- earned means. However, even where 
actual war destruction was relatively slight, industry found itself in a run- down 
state” .^ ' In other words, it would have taken a long time for a country to reach the 
necessary level of production.
Meaning and Scope o f  “Free” World Recovery Program. The “free” world 
recovery program was not restricted to Western Europe, but was extended to other 
parts of the world, that were labeled “underdeveloped”. These were areas where 
major resources existed for development, but, for one reason or another, this 
potential development had not yet been realized.^^ Low standard of living, 
epidemics, illiteracy, malnutrition, social disorganization, civil unrest, inadequate 
communications and public utilities, subsistence economies based on primitive 
agricultural methods, and shortage of financial resources for extensive 
development programs were the predominant characteristics of these areas.“**
Paul Hoffman, ‘Foreign Trade and the EGA’, 10 November 1948.RG 286 Papers o f the AID, 
Office of Administrator Speeches, 1948-50, Box l.NARA.
Oral History Interview with Gunther Harkort, Represantative o f Federal Republic o f Germany to 
the EGA, HTR; Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstniction of 
Western Europe, 1947-52, Gambridge: Gambridge University Press:1987.
Young Hum Kim, Technical Assistance Program o f the U.N. and of the U.S.: Gomparative Study. 
Ph. D., Galifornia: University of Galifornia, 1960, p. 16 
Ibid p.28,357
12
American officials recognized that economic progress, national independence and 
evolution towards democracy in these underdeveloped areas were of grave 
concern to U.S. interests ·^* since these factors would directly strengthen the 
American- led “free” world. Moreover, these areas could contribute to this 
strength by providing a source of raw materials, the shortage of which was a 
predominant problem for the industrialized countries. The fact that some 
European civilian production had been curtailed due to shortages of materials 
warned of the necessity of expanding sources for raw material on which the “free” 
nations relied.^“ With only 6% of the world’s population and 7% of its area the 
U.S. accounted for roughly half of the world’s industrial output, yet virtually all of 
U.S. “ natural rubber, manganese, chromium and tin; the largest part of the U.S. 
uranium ore; a quarter of its zinc and copper; and a third or more of its lead and 
aluminum came from abroad, mostly from the underdeveloped countries.^'’ Of 
the fifteen basic minerals, the U.S. was relatively self- sufficient in only six items, 
coal, petroleum, iron, sulphur , phosphate rock and potash. It imported three 
quarters of its tungsten and a third or more of its lead.“*’ The scope of its 
dependency reveals the importance of the underdeveloped areas to the “ free” 
world countries.
Oral History Review with Stanley Andrews, Director o f Technical Cooperation Administration, 
1952-53. 31 October 1970,HTR, p.3.
Report o f Partners in Progress by International Advisory Board, March 1951. Harry Truman 
Library, B File, The Point 4 Program, Box 2, p. 40 
Objectives and Nature of Point 4 Program, HTR. Papers o f Benjamin Hardy, Box 1, Folder: Point 
4., p. 3
Report o f Partners in Progress by International Advisory Board, March 1951. Harry Truman 
Library, B File, The Point 4 Program, Box 2, p. 41
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After examining the situation, U.S. officials defined two types of problems: 
the immediate problems, which were related to improving the material ravages 
of the war; and the larger problems, which involved organizing the world economy 
to attain the maximum output of goods and services, and thus elevate living 
standards.^®They elaborated a joint effort by the U.S. , Western Europe, and the 
underdeveloped countries that was accepted as a prerequisite for survival.^®
The fundamental means for the success of this joint effort was a 
considerable increase in production and productivity that would end the enduring 
dollar shortage. This meant the restoration of European self- sufficiency^** and an 
end to dependence on massive amounts of external borrowing.
The increasing tendency of U.S. officials was to attribute the present 
European difficulties to the inefficiency of small economic units. This was a 
serious structural weakness since it meant excessive fragmentation, exchange 
barriers, and protected markets. These factors prevented “the unleashing of 
competitive economic forces on a continental scale which would provide a viable 
basis for recovery and self- sustaining growth.”
This belief led to the advocacy of an “integrated” European economic 
structure, the most widely used concept of the era. Economic integration was “the 
process whereby economic frontiers between the member states were gradually
William Clayton, ‘Importance o f International Economic Relations to the World Peace’, U.S. 
Department o f the State Bulledn, Vol. XIV, 21 April 1946, p.l72  
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eliminated. It was the situation in which national components of a larger economy 
were no longer separated by economic frontiers , but function together as an 
entity” .'’^  The key principle of this mechanism was non- discriminatory and 
multilateral trade, whereby all countries had free and equal access to trade and to 
the raw materials of the world.®^
U.S. officials defined this international scheme as a sound economic 
system. Implementation of this scheme necessitated a close cooperation of 
nations; therefore, economic interdependence, international cooperation , and 
supranational entities would be the basic pillars of the system. Moreover, this 
scheme required the leadership of a strong power, the U.S., with its unparalled 
economic strength and tremendous prestige."’''The task of the U.S. was “ reviving 
world economy & in keeping it in operation after revival as a general manager.” ®
In the June 19, 1947 issue of the New York Times it was stated that the U.S. 
would spend considerable amounts of money to promote world recovery. The 
nature of this aid was defined as assistance to those which were able and willing to 
make their maximum contribution to the same cause. Aid must be distributed to
William Molle, The Economics of European Integration:Theoiy,Practice and Policy. Brookfield, 
Darthmount Publication, 1994, p. 13.
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those points and into those projects which held out the promise of increasing 
production.
Greek-Turkish A id  Program. In 1947, the Truman administration presented 
the Greek-Turkish Aid Program , known as the Truman Doctrine, and the 
European Recovery Program, known as the Marshall Plan. In 1949, they presented 
the Technical Assistance Program, known as Point Four. Each of these programs 
had been designed for the purpose of strengthening the whole structure of 
American foreign policy in support of a free U.S. and a “free” world.
The Greek - Turkish Aid Program was the first program of its kind that the 
U.S. had ever undertaken. It was regarded as the forerunner of the Marshall Plan, 
the Point Four program and other programs undertaken by the Truman 
Administration to meet the new responsibilities that had been thrust upon the 
U.S. as postwar leader of the “free” world.
In the immediate aftermath of WWII, there was a power vacuum in the 
Middle East. The U.S. administration believed that their indifference to this 
vacuum would mean the U.S.S.R’s presence in this crucial region. With the 
Truman Doctrine, the U.S. administration declared its willingness to act as 
Britain’s successor in the region. In addition, the Doctrine had a global 
application in that the U.S., from that time on, would stand against “totalitarian 
regimes imposed on free people by direct or indirect aggression.’’ The U.S. would
”  Ibid.
38 Francis Russell, Foreign Policy In A Cold War, Deparment of the State Bulletin, Vol. XXII, May 
15, 1950, p. 758
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support “free people” who were resisting any attempted “subjugation”, whether 
by armed minorities, as in the case of Greece, or by outside pressure, as in the case 
of Turkey.*^’
On March 12, 1947, President Truman delivered his historic speech to 
Congress, in which he defined economic assistance as a primary response. In the 
words of Truman, “I believed that our help should be primarily through economic 
and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political 
process.” Truman’s speech was a turning point in U.S. foreign policy. At first 
glance, the Truman Doctrine appeared to be the declaration of an “ ideological 
crusade” without mentioning any economic aspects. The Doctrine became “an 
ideological shield behind which the US progressed to rebuild the western political- 
economic system and counter Communism.” By exploiting the fear of 
Communism, Truman justified a gigantic aid program to prevent the collapse of 
the European and American economies."’^
The Senate passed the Greek- Turkish Aid Program on April 22, 1947. The 
House passed the Greek- Turkish Aid Legislation on May 8, 1947. On the same 
day, the 80''' Congress Public Law 75 authorized the allocation of $ 400,000,000 in 
military and economic aid to these two countries. From this amount, $
Harry Truman Library, President’s Secretary’s Files. Subject File, Box no. 189, Folder: Turkey- 
PSF Subject File, 22 December 1948, p. 44
Lee Edwards, ‘Congress and the Origins of the Cold War: the Tniman Doctrine’, World Affairs, 
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300,000,000 was earmarked to Greece as military and economic aid“ , and the 
remaining $ 100,000,000 to Turkey.
European Recovery Program. In 1945 and 1946 loans were made to various 
European countries. By 1947 total U.S. aid allocations were over $ 9 billion. 
However, it was soon realized by President Truman and his associates that those 
loans, especially the loan to Britain, had not been enough and there was little 
improvement in the prevailing situation of these countries.“  While these loans 
might relieve the situation temporarily, they would accomplish little toward 
enabling the Continent to stand on its own feet.“ The U. S. officials concluded that 
this generous aid should not be conceived as help to individual countries but to 
Western Europe as a whole“
Within the framework of the European Recovery Program (ERP) ,aid would 
be granted according to an overall integrated concept which took into account the 
problems of European nations in relation to each other. A prosperous, 
independent, united Europe would act as a barrier against the spread of Soviet 
Communism.“  An assistance program of this scope would necessitate new forms of 
economic cooperation among the European countries. For participating countries 
to be part of the initiative, each had to develop its own proposals and plans
U.S. Department o f State Bulletin, Vol. 16, 4 May 1947, Supplement.
Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction o f Western 
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compatible to their individual problems. Moreover, European countries had to be 
self- supporting at the program’s conclusion, 4 or 5 years hence.*’®
The U.S. administration gave the first public indication of such a European 
assistance program in the Delta Speech of Under Secretary, Dean Acheson on May 
8 1947, and this indication found its full expression in Secretary of State General 
George Marshall’s June 5 1947 Harvard Speech. This reconstruction program 
appealed to the countries of Western Europe to participate in a joint European 
process based on self- help and mutual cooperation.*’® It was a comprehensive 
undertaking to stimulate production; reestablish conditions of trade; and renew 
the psychological climate of investment. It would reestablish an atmosphere of 
trust and cooperation among nations that had previously existed but had been 
badly damaged by the WWII experiences of invasion and occupation.’*’ The 
American Marshall planners hoped to create an integrated European Market that 
could boost productivity, raise living standards, and lower prices, thus setting the 
stage for security and recovery on the Continent and for a fully multilateral system 
of world trade.”
“  Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction o f Western Europe, 1947- 
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Establishment of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC)’^on April 16, 1948 was the first concrete outcome of this appeal. Through 
the OEEC, sixteen European countries agreed to the coordination of their 
economic endeavors, including the exploitation of their natural resources and 
commercial capabilities; modernization of their industrial and agricultural 
equipment; reduction of trade obstacles ; striving for full employment; restoration 
and maintenance of economic stability; and confidence in their national 
currencies. Finally, they agreed to work towards world freedom of trade and 
complete convertibility of currencies.’®
Consistent with ERP objectives this supranational body set as its goal an 
increase in European production by 25 %, thereby making the OEEC countries 
independent of extraordinary outside assistance by 1952-53, a condition described 
as viability.’^
On March 13,1948 , by the margin of 67 to 17, the Senate authorized $ 5.3 
billion for the first year of ERP. On April 1 1948 Truman signed the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1948, which was approved by the 80'’’ Congress as Public Law 472. 
The U.S. would commit $12.4 billion to European recovery for the next four years. 
To administer the ERP, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) was
’‘^ Cleveland Harland, U.S. Permanent Representative to the NATO, ‘Marshall Plan : Than and 
Now’, April 1967. Harry Truman Library, Student Research File, Box. 5. Folder: Establishing the 
Marshall Plan, 1947-48
”  Robert Maijolin, Secretary- General o f OEEC, A European Way of Thinking: OEEC At Work For 
Europe, papers o f Paul G. Hoffman. Folder 3: ECA Publications, HTR..
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established as an agency independent of the State Departm ent, and auto industry 
executive Paul Hoffman was chosen as its head/'’
Evaluation of ERP revealed that the greatest achievement occurred in 
production. From 1947 to 1951 the ERP countries’ collective gross national 
products grew from $120 billion to almost $ 159 billion, a 32.5% increase.”’ In its 
13''' Report to Congress EGA reported that industrial output in OEEC countries in 
1947 had been at about 87% of the prewar level. In 1948 this climbed to 98% ; in 
1949 to 110% ; in 1950 to 122%;in 1951 to more than 134%. ”
Technical Assistance Program. In the fourth point of his inaugural address 
of January,1949, President Truman appealed to U.S. citizens to undertake a 
program to improve the living conditions of the peoples of underdeveloped areas 
through the use of modern technology.’® This appeal for a Technical Assistance 
Program, known as Point Four, became law on June 5, 1950 by the authorization 
of the 8T' Congress under the title of ‘Act for International Development (AID).’’® 
The intention of the U.S. policy makers was to create vigorous. Western- 
oriented economies and to raise living standards in the underdeveloped 
countries. The primary emphasis of the short- term objectives was on agricultural 
production to increase food supplies. Such improvements in these countries were 
presumed to ensure political, social and economic stability and consequently
’"'Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins o f the Cold War, 1945-50; p. 149-50.
Ibid., p. 164-5
”  EGA 13‘‘' Report to Congress, From OEEC Stadstical Bulletin, November, 1952, p. 15-21 
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would have the effect of strengthening international peace which coincided with 
U.S. national interests. The long- term goal of the U.S. technical assistance 
program W cis the encouragement of “free” institutions within the frame work of a 
free society.®"
Containment Policy. The U.S. regarded Soviet Union as the greatest threat 
to its national security. Therefore, in these years, restriction of Soviet influence 
within the boundaries of the U.S.S.R was the principal goal of U.S. foreign policy. 
For U.S. officials, the main task of U.S diplomacy was “ to ensure that Moscow’s 
attempts to widen its influence were unsuccessful’’.®' This policy, known as 
containment, aimed to stop the USSR from gaining control over areas that at 
some future time might enable an attempt at war against the U.S.®^
John Gaddis described the whole idea of “containment’’ as based on the 
assumption that it is sometimes better to live with adversaries than to seek to 
destroy them. In addition, the containment policy aimed at “competing selectively 
within a framework of overall coexistence , cooperating generally within a 
framework of shared interests’’.®®
Importance o f  Middle East and Turkey. The containment policy and its 
ofyectives explain the importance of Turkey’s participation in this “free” world 
recovery program. In an address to the U.S. Congress Truman defined the Middle
Kim, Technical Assistance Program of the U.N. and of the U.S.:Comparative Study, p .233. 
Gaddis, The U.S. and the End of Cold War, p 27-8
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East and Africa as regions of vital importance to the security of the free world In 
its traditional policy Great Britain used the Middle East as a “dam” to hold back 
the flow of Russia.®'’ The power vacuum in the Middle East was the direct result of 
contracting British power throughout the globe. Britain could no longer maintain 
its commitment in the Middle East.^^and the U.S. feared that if the U.S.S.R gained 
a presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, they would have the ability to cut the 
flow of critical raw materials to the West, especially that of oil.
The role of oil as a significant ingredient in the victory over the Axis powers 
caused a change in U.S. attitude to the Middle East. Securing Middle Ecist oil rights 
became critical to U.S. national security, due to the decline of the Western 
Hemisphere reserves.®’ This decline led to a shift in the center of world oil 
production from the US- Gulf- Caribbean area to the Middle East.®® Production in 
the region soared from 66,000 long tons in 1938 to 11.8 million long tons in 1947.®® 
As J.H. Carmical’s New York Times article points out, the cheapest oil production 
was in the Middle East. Excluding royal payments, actual cost of delivering oil to 
tankers in the Persian Gulf from Kuwait, Iran and Saudia Arabia was relatively 
nominal.®"
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The Middle East’s airfields were as important as its oil reserves. The Egyptian 
base at Cairo-Suez was particularly attractive because it would enable the “free” world 
countries to bomb the Soviet oil-refinery industry , a principal target. The Western 
powers believed that Soviet radar nets and air defenses in the South were weak. Thus, 
in future, air campaigns could be launched from Egyptian base before Russian forces 
seized the area.
U.S. policies in relation to Turkey were inspired by the conviction that 
‘fundamental’ and ‘critical’ national security interests were at stake in the region. In 
a memorandum of January 5, 1952 President Truman stated that the integrity of 
Greece, Turkey and Iran, countries bordering the Iron Curtain, was closely involved 
with the security of other nations of the “free” world.
For U.S. policy makers Turkey was the only country that could serve as a useful 
military bastion against Communist expansion. Therefore, Turkish independence 
must be preserved for reasons of Middle Eastern strategy.®* If U.S.S.R. dominated 
Turkey the entire Middle East could fall within the Soviet orbit.®'' Once the USSR had 
obtained full mastery of this territory, strategically important in terms of 
communications and natural resources, it would be in a more favorable position for
Lefifler, A Preponderance o f Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold 
War, p.238
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95expansion.
Soviet Threats to Turkey and Their Repercussions. U.S. anxieties regarding 
Turkey were not baseless. Stalin hoped to control more territory adjacent to the 
strategic port of Batum, from which Soviets shipped considerable amounts of oil. 
Moreover, having “friendly” governments in countries bordering on the U.S.S.R. was 
vital for its national security. Therefore, Turkey remained a gap in the Soviet security 
belt.®"
These considerations were the main motives behind the U.S.S.R’s territorial 
demand from Turkey. In the immediate postwar era, the Soviets had massed troops 
along the Turkish borders and were demanding the revision of the 1936 Montreaux 
Convention on the straits and m ^or territorial concessions from Ankara. At the 
Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers in December 1945 Stalin revealed that the 
Soviet Union sought to annex Kars and Ardahan, in Eastern Turkey, and to gain 
military bases at the Straits.®  ^ These areas would be of considerable value to the 
USSR, primarily since their acquisition would extend Soviet territory into Turkey 
beyond mountain barriers near the present border. The Soviets would outflank 
Iranian Azerbaijan and would also be in a far better position to move South and West 
toward Iraq and Syria. Soviet opportunities would be significantly increased for 
penetrating the whole Middle East and the Mediterranean basin.®®
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In July 1946 Moscow sent a proposal to Ankara for a new regime in the 
Dardanelles. Acceptance of this proposal would make, along with Turkey, the 
three Black Sea powers of Soviet Union, Rumania and Bulgaria, the future 
decision makers for the Dardanelles, at the exclusion of all other nations, 
including Britain and the U.S. Moreover the Straits would be put under joint 
Turkish- Russian defense.®®
These sorts of threats had direct repercussions on Turkey. It had to keep a 
large mobilized army with the resulting drain upon the country’s economy, which 
it could not long support.'®“ Turkey was not a war stricken country; thus its 
economy was not destroyed by the war but only strained. Its economic situation 
was not impossible to solve at all."” However, the obligation of keeping a 
mobilized army meant that Turkey urgently required foreign assistance for the 
purpose of maintaining its independence."’·
Economic Policy o f Turkish Republic. The Turkish Republic had been 
founded in 1923 after winning a War of Independence against the Entente Powers. 
The policy makers of this young republic were aware that winning the military battle 
was only one facet of the struggle and was not enough to ensure a nation’s 
independence. At the Economic Congress of Izmir in February 1923 Mustafa Kemal,
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founder and first President of the Turkish Republic, declared that it should be clear 
to the nation that military victories alone could not secure the future unless they 
were completed by economic victories.“’*
These words of Atatürk reflected the awareness of the policy makers of the 
young Turkish Republic of the present world system. Modernization and 
rationalization of economic were the ideals of these officials. They wanted an 
organization that could meet the current needs of technical activity and remove all 
factors causing wastes of time, money, labor and material.“’^
Scholars divide the economic policy of Turkey from the early days of the 
Republic to WWII into two stages. In the first stage, from 1923 to 1930, the 
government interfered little in economics, hoping that private enterprise would rise 
and act as a dynamic factor in the economy. From 1930 onwards, the government 
developed its etatist orientation and began “ taking a more direct hand in the 
economy” .“’"’
The 1923-30 Era. In the Izmir Economic Congress of 1923 the principles of 
Turkey’s economic policy were laid down stressing the presence of natural resources 
and facilities for economic development. It defined the country’s needs as the 
utilization of progressive and scientific ideas for the development of the primitive 
Turkish economy, and the local production of goods in demand. The existence of 
foreign capital was acceptable on the condition that it was “not counter to Turkey’s
Hershlag, Turkey: An Economy In Transition, p .l5
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27
aspirations towards economic and political independence nor infringing on the laws 
of the country” ."**’
The main objective of the Izmir Congress was to encourage private industrial 
initiative through legislation. A law of 1924 that exempted from duties raw materials 
for export industries ; legislation of 1925 granting tax and duty exemptions as well as 
various government subsidies to sugar production; and the 1927 Summary Law for 
the Encouragement of Industry were among the notable legislative efforts to attain 
this objective."*^ In this era the general aims were set forth for achieving economic 
and financial independence; improving the situation of the peasants; securing the 
economic future of the country through the exploitation of resources; and laying the 
foundations of industry by nationalizing basic branches of the national economy."’® 
Since the Congress granted the main economic role to private enterprise, 
government planning was insignificant and state enterprise equally limited. "*®
The expectation that private enterprise soundly fill this role would not prove 
to be realistic. The First Industrial Census ,conducted in 1927, indicated that of the 
existing 65,245 establishments only about 3.2 % were employing more than 10 
workers and only 155 had a labor force of 100 or more. The results of this census
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revealed that private capital , even when supported by the state, was too weak to 
assume the burden of establishing industry."'*
It was evident to the Turkish policy makers that no serious private capital 
resources could have been put at the disposal of economic development. Therefore 
the Izmir Economic Congress concluded that the task of the State begins where the 
activity of private enterprise ends."' This ambigious assumption would be clearly 
defined by the 1930s, which indicated a total shift in economic policy planning. The 
collapse in the Western capitalist economy, which caused a fall in demand and 
prices; instability of currency and dislocation of international trade; and the 
apparent impressive economic records of the authoritarian states, along with good 
relations with Soviet Russia, strengthened Turkey’s tendency toward a planned 
economy."^
1930 to WWII: Beginning o f the Statist EraiThe 1929 Great Depression had its 
effect on Turkey, leading to substantial declines in its main export agricultural 
products. “This meant that imports, consisting predominantly of industrial consumer 
goods, had to be cut down as well. With the shortage of foreign exchange due to the 
decline in exports , industrial self sufficiency had become a necessity, and the 
government began a plan for industrialization, by which state enterprises would 
develop consumer goods industries.” "^
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In its 3“* Congress, the Republican People’s Party (RPP) proclaimed that, 
although the Party adhered basically to the principle of private enterprise and 
activity, the urgent economic needs of the country called for the active 
intervention of the State. ”^As stated in the RPP program, the needs that arose 
from recent developments paved the way for the adoption of etatism, an 
interventionist economic policy involving direct economic activity by the State 
through its public economic enterprises. In the RPP program the main tasks of the 
state were defined as public works; education and instruction; public hygiene; 
social education; and economic issues in the spheres of agriculture, commerce 
and industry.”“
Etatism became one of the six basic principles of the Republic in 1931 and 
was incorporated into the Constitution in 1937. Creation of a state- run industrial 
sector was the most profound outcome of this policy”*’ In 1935, at the opening of 
the Izmir Fair, Atatürk defined etatism as a system peculiar to Turkey which had 
“evolved from the principle of private activity of the individual; but places on the 
State responsibility for the national economy with consideration of the needs of a 
great nation, a large country and of many things they had not been done so far”, 
in other words , the coexistence of a private economy and an expanding state 
economy .”  ^However, the existence of state and private capital side by side was
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more in theory than in practice. The etatist policy “alienated and adversely 
affected the immature and poorly equipped private enterprise by frequently unfair 
competition from the public sector and discriminating fiscal and financial 
policies” .”*
Industrialization of the country gathered momentum in the 1930s. Turkish 
government officials believed that through industrialization Turkey could attain 
its economic independence; improve its balance of payments; raise living 
standards through economic growth; and increase its physical production.”® Total 
industrial investment in the 1930s amounted to TL 900 million, or 10% of gross 
national product (GNP). The share of industry in the GNP increased from 14% in 
1929 to 19% in 1939.’®" By the end of the 1940s there were 100 state- run industrial 
enterprises. These government monopolies included consumer goods, such as 
matches, salt, sugar and tobacco; industrial raw materials, such as coal, electricity, 
iron, steel, copper and cotton fibres and services, such as rail and sea transport, 
radio, mail, telephone and telegraph communications.'®'
Construction of industrial units to support local or regional agricultural 
production and natural resources; location of industrial units close to raw 
materials and labor power sources; and the replacement of imported goods, such 
as cement, paper, iron, and steel, by national production were defined as the main
Z.Y. Hershlag, Economic Planning in Turkey, Istanbul: The Economic Research
Foundation, 1968, p.2
Hershlag, The Contemporary Turkish Economy,p. 13 
'2" ibid., p. 14-15
Öncü,’ Chambers o f Industry in Turkey: An Inquiry into State- Industry Relations as a 
Distributive Domain’, in Özbudun & Ulusan, ed.. The Polidcal Economy of Income Distribution in 
Turkey, p. 463
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objectives of the industrialization movement of the 1930s.'^‘ This import 
substitution strategy attempted to produce at certain levels on the internal market 
goods which were previously imported.'“^  In the 1930s the Government was 
determined to prohibit the imports of goods which could be produced at home, 
and to generally restrict imports as far as possible to products which were 
indispensible to the national diet and raw materials for the development of 
industry.
At the core of this insistence on industrialization- based development lay 
Turkey’s refusal of the strict international division of labor which assigned Turkey 
the role of an agriculturist country. This type of division between industrialized 
Western countries and raw material suppliers was generally viewed by officials as 
serving the wealth of the West and making the latter dependent to these countries. 
The following excerpt from a January 8,1934 Press Conference of Celal Bayar, 
then Economy Minister of Turkish Republic clearly reflected the consensual views 
of Turkey:
“this advocacy that leans on international division of labor would 
lead to the deprivation of a country from industry, as the source of 
the tools which enabled a country to defend itself when 
encountering external danger. Nor could this be accurate from an 
economical view point. An unindustrialized nation will always be at
Kepenek, Gelişimi, Üretim Yapisiyla ve Sorunlariyla Türkiye Ekonomisi, p.58,60 
Mustafa Sanli, ‘ Development Policy o f Turkey: Concept, Policies and Instruments, in Yahya 
Tezel, ed.. Concepts 8c Instruments o f the Development o f Turkey: A Model for Palestine, Ankara, 
1997, p.7
Hershlag, Turkey: An Economy In Transition, p.l53
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a disadvantage in the exchange of manufactured goods and raw 
materials, and will never reach the welfare level of the industrialized
nations. 125
In their paternalistic fashion the leaders of the new Turkey felt that 
industrial centers could transform peasants into a technically skilled work force, 
thus reducing the country’s dependence on agriculture.’^ *’ In this insistence 
,however, officials oversimplify the question of necessary financial resources for 
such industrialization in a country which depended predominandy on 
agriculture.
On the eve of WWII Turkey was still an underdeveloped and economically 
weak country. Although progress had been made in some areas, Turkey failed to 
achieve economic self-sufficiency and independence.'“’ As Table 3 reveals, 
throughout the 1930s there was a surplus in the budget only in 1932-33; however, 
there was a great increase in the budgetary deficit in the last years of the peace 
and in the first year of the war, which reflected the great increase in military 
spending.
Ilhan Tekeli & Selim ilkin, Uygulamaya Geçerken Türkiye’de Devletçilig;in Oluşumu, Ankara: 
ODTÜ, 1982, p.184-5
Deringil,, Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 20 
'” lb id .,p .l3  
Ibid.,p.l9
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TABLEJ'IO_3 JJJJRKISH_BUDGETSJ93.0/J-1939/40 (In_TL Million)
YEAR_______ RECEIEIS „.EXPENDITURE . _ JDEELCIT(r) or_S.URPLUS.(.t)
1930-1 196.3 210.1 -13.8
1931-2 165.2 181.9 -16.7
1932-3 182.5 174.0 + 8.5
1933-4 170.2 173.6 -3.4
1934-5 195.0 202.1 -7.1
1935-6 218.3 223.7 -5.4
1936-7 250.8 260.3 -9.5
1937-8 275.8 303.5 -27.7
1938-9 266.9 311.1 -44.2
1939-40 273.4 398.7 -125.3
SOURCE: T.C. Basbakanlik istatistik Umum Müdürlüğü,
Statistical Yearbook of the General Director of Statistics vol 15, p. 393 
During WWII etatist policies survived largely due to the necessity for
government controls in the face of war conditions. State monopolies; ownership in 
industry and services; and substantial control in various fields of economic activity 
were already an established fact in the Turkish economy. With the war came 
additional emergency measures.'^® The shifting of a substantial share of 
production and services from civil to direct or indirect military purposes was 
further justification for these strict measures.*^'War meant an increase in military 
spending; so, war was a condition that aggravated the deficit in the balance of 
payments.
The neglect of Turkish agriculture during the Turkish government’s 
import- substitution strategy is a more conclusive reason for the failure of the 
etatist economic policy of the 1930s. In the Turkish context this meant the neglect 
of 80% of the population'^' and had deep repercussions on the Turkish economy.
Hershlag, Turkey: An Economy In Transition, p. 179 
Hershlag, The Contemporary Turkish Economy,p.l6
131 ibid., p.l72
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In 1940, Turkey practiced traditional subsistence agriculture.'^“ Agricultural 
production technology was primitive and production generally located close to 
market facilities, dependent on organic power, and highly affected by weather 
conditions.'®^ These factors resulted in low productivity and incomes.
In the middle of the 1930s Turkey might have been favorably compared 
with only a few countries , such as China, the Phillipines, India, Albania and 
Egypt. Despite the predominant place of agriculture in the economy, in the 1930s, 
development of agriculture was not included in the first 5-Year Industry Plan, the 
foremost objective of which was the replacement of imported goods with local 
production.'®^ The needs of the peasants were overshadowed by the desire to 
attain the objective of high industrialization. In the absence of new technology 
and government policies supporting agricultural development in food crops, 
change had a slow pace. During the 1930s, the contribution of the Turkish 
government to agricultural investment was only one third of all public investment. 
A small amount of agricultural product was marketed and a limited amount of 
food crops could be sold only at small distances.'®'’
The cultural and social backwardness of the peasant was an important 
determiner for the very slow pace of development. The Turkish rural population , 
of around 40,000 villages, was almost completely out of touch with organized 
markets for their products and with sources of supply for industrial goods. With
'“ Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 93, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture Cooperating with U.S. Aid, February 1972.
Kepenek, Gelişimi, Üretim Yapisiyla ve Sorunlarıyla Türkiye Ekonomisi, p.37 
'"Mbid., p. 58
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their closed social life and minimum incentive, they could not produce a 
marketable surplus. Instead, they preferred to consume most of their products in 
or near the area where they were produced.'^*’
The low agricultural productivity of Turkey could be partly explained in 
terms of the constant danger of war. Since 1939 the country was obliged to keep a 
large part of its farm hands under arms. The situation still prevailed in the late 
1940’s and weighed heavily on the Turkish general economy.*^’ Additional 
reasons for the low productivity include extreme dependence on natural 
conditions, and lack of adequate communications and irrigation facilities.’^®
After witnessing the insufficiency of their policies in offering remedies to 
the backwardness of the country, Turkish policy makers made a change in their 
priorities that can be seen in the development programs of the postwar era.
Postwar Economic Planning During the War Years. In 1944 the Sûkrû 
Saraçoğlu Government , in accordance vdth their decision to prepare a 
development program and plan for the postwar era, appointed a Commission that 
submitted an excerpt of the ‘Substance Report (Oz Rapor)’ of the 1946 Plan on 
May 7, 1947. In this report, economic and political independence were defined as
Ibid., p.150; Foreign Agricultural Economic Report, No. 93, Economic Re.search Service, U.S. 
Department o f Agriculture cooperating with U.S. Aid, February 1972.
Report o f Agricultural Phases in Turkey by Ralph Ward, Agricultural Economist, May 1952. RG 
469 Records o f the Assistance Mission to Turkey, Records Relating to TA projects, NARA, Box. 2. p. 
12; Confidential Member Report No. 9 on Turkish Agriculture, Barker Mission to Turkey, 15 
October, 1950. RG 286, Records o f the AID, NARA. Mission to Turkey, Classified Subject Files, Box 
12
General Memo of the Long Term Programme of Turkey. RG 59, General Records o f the 
Department of State, Records of the Office o f Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, NARA. Subject 
File: Turkey, 1947- 50, Box. 29
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the main objectives, attainment of which necessitated the implementation of 
polyculture, a practice aimed at diversifying agriculture to supply the required raw 
materials for its industry.**®
A new willingness of Turkey to accept foreign financial resources was 
reflected in this 1946 Plan. Previously Turkish officials were skeptical about any 
foreign assistance due to deep rooted memories of the Capitulations , the 
concessions granted to the foreign powers during the Ottoman era that turned 
out to be the main hindrance to economic independence and the most efficient 
means of foreign exploitation. The difficulty of the setdement of old debts during 
the Lausane negotiations*·“’, remained fresh in their minds.
Their skepticism gave the impression that Turks regard dealings with 
foreigners as a zero- sum game, the feeling that if something is good for the 
foreigner it must be bad for Turkey and vice versa, rather than mutual beneficial
141arrangements.
These same Turkish officials however realized the impossibility of self- 
sufficiency in economics. Therefore they concluded that foreign money and 
assistance was unavo idab le .T h is new attitude of the Turkish policy makers was 
expressed in the 1947 Budget Speech of Tahsin Bekir Balta, Deputy Commerce 
Minister, who stated that
Ilhan Tekeli & Selim ilkin, Savaş Sonrasi Ortaminda 1947 Türkiye iktisadi Kalkinma Plani, 
Ankara: ODTU.1974, p. 1-2
Merih Celasun, Sources o f Industrial Growth and Structural Change, Washington: World Bank, 
1983.
Edwin J. Cohn, Turkish Economic, Social and Political Change: The Development of A More 
Prosperous and Open Society, N.Y: Preager Publications, 1970.
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“Establishment of the required enterprises through ordinary 
tax sources is neither just nor financially possible. We will 
establish these enterprises through possible credits, even if they 
are from foreign sources”
The 1946 Plan defined the development of heavy- industry as a 
precondition for Turkey’s industrialization. However, Turkey’s financial strength 
was not sufficient for this type of development. As with many developing countries 
with scarce capital and resources, Turkey faced the necessity of selective planning 
and investment d ec is io n s .T h e  outcome was the withdrawal of the 1946 Plan and 
preparation of the 1947 Development Plan, known as the Vaner Plan.
Vaner Plan: Turkish Program for Economic Recovery fo r the Postwar Era. 
Kemal Süleyman Vaner , the Head Counsellor of the Ministry of Economy, was 
appointed in February 1947 to head the Committee to prepare a development 
plan, which was submitted to Parliament on November 5, 1947. Unlike the 1946 
Plan, which assumed Turkey’s neutrality in the postwar era, the Vaner Plan 
responded to recent developments, especially to the Harvard Speech of Secretary 
of State Marshall.
The Vaner Plan became the country report for Turkey submitted to the 
OEEC as Turkish Program for Economic Recovery. It defined the private sector as 
the priority and limited the public sector to infrastructure activities. *^ ®The sectoral 
priorities were agriculture, transportation related to agriculture; and energy units.
Tekeli Scllkin, Savas Sonrasi Ortamında 1947 Türkiye iktisadi Kalkinma Plani, p. 7 
Hershlag, Economic Planning in Turkey, p. 36
Tekeli & ilkin, Savaş Sonrasi Ortaminda 1947 Türkiye iktisadi Kalkinma Plani, p. 4, 7
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The Plan defined a good transportation system as the most important means for 
agricultural development.'·*’
After analysis, OEEC experts concluded that the Vaner Plan was too 
ambitious and could not keep pace with the agricultural needs of the ERP. The 
Plan went through a number of subsequent revisions in 1948 and “eventually lost 
its integrative and operational character” .'^ ®
U.S. Turkish Special Agreement. On July 4, 1948 Turkey entered a special 
agreement with the U.S. Through its participation in the recovery program Turkey 
attempted to adjust its economic system to more liberal western standards. 
Shaped with this understanding, the objectives of projects designed to serve the 
economic development of Turkey , were defined as a means “ to better the lot of 
the overwhelming peasant population, balance the improvement of the various 
branches of national economy, increase the share of private entrepreneurs in 
economic activities, reduce government intervention and ownership in industry, 
to rely more on market decisions and price mechanism in both local and foreign 
markets” .'*® If Turkey succeeded in its objectives it could integrate itself into the 
world economy.
Kepenek, Gelişimi, Üretim Yapısıyla ve Sorunlarıyla Türkiye Ekonomisi, p. 81 
Tekeli & ilkin. Savaş Sonrası Ortamında 1947 Türkiye iktisadi Kalkınma Planı, p. 10 
Bertil Walstedt, State Manufacturing Enterprise in A Mixed Economy, Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University, 1980, p. 81.
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HIGHWAYIMERQVEMENT AND. AGRICULTURAL MECHANIZATJONJN
TURKEY.(19.48r 52)
M eaning o f  Good Transportation System. Transport is “ a necessary 
ingredient of nearly every aspect of economic and social development. It plays a 
key role in getting land into production, in marketing facility transport is so 
crucial that poor transport has been regarded as a major factor in world hunger. 
The high cost of moving farm products; the long delays and consequent damage 
and loss to perishables have been powerful deterrents to increasing food 
supplies. The prevailing realities of the post war era confirmed this definition.
Assistant Secretary of State for Transport and Communications Norton 
explained how crucial transport and communication was to the world’s welfare 
and claimed that the ultimate answer to the world’s present turmoil, hunger and 
fear was the development of understanding between the peoples of the world.  ^
Consistent with this understanding practical forms of cooperation could be 
possible. Norton added that this was the background for the conduct of U.S. 
foreign policy within the framework of which were to be found specific objectives 
in transport and communications. These policy objectives consider that worldwide 
facilities for the movement of goods, persons and ideas should be developed and 
made available to all peoples.^
In the aftermath of WWII most of the war-stricken, developed countries 
realized the inadequacy of their transport networks. Their experiences revealed 
the need for new roads and bridges on tactical and access roads to timber, mines.
 ^ Wilfred Owen, Strategy For Mobility, Brooklings Institution, Transport Research Program, 1964,
p i
2 Lawrence .Norton, Assistant Secretary of State For Transport and Communications, ‘Promotion 
of World Understanding Through Transport and Communication’, U.S. Department o f State, Vol. 
XVI, 22 June 1947, p. 1241-2 
 ^ ibid.
and other strategic highways. Even though Turkey was not a war stricken country it
faced the same difficulties that arose from inadequate transport facilities.^
Comparison o f Turkish Road Length with Other European Countries. 
TABLE_^№Э4L·XiBlPJУΠSOi^_X>E_TUJmSH RQAD_.LENGTH. WITH_QTHER 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES PTR KM2_LAND/_(yEAR 1948):
Countryj______ _______Road Lengtlr_(Meters_):
England
France
Italy
Germany
Czechslovakia
Rumania
Bulgaria
Yugoslavia
Greece
1210
1100
1050
1240
750
580
340
270
170
175Turkey
A comparison of the road length in Turkey with other European countries 
( Table 4) reveals the seriousness and urgency of the highway improvement 
program. Geographical obstacles; insufficient technical knowledge; lack of capital; 
and lack of an administrative body and skilled staff for highway construction 
might partially explain the inadequacy of the Turkish highway system. However, 
these reasons alone cannot adequately explain Greece’s 10- times greater length of 
highways than Turkey, considering the two countries common similarities and 
weaknesses. The most convincing explanation for the poor condition of the 
Turkish transport network is the transportation policy of the administration.
Transportation Policy o f  Turkey: Ottoman Era. Since its inception, the 
Turkish Republic had concentrated on the development of railroads. The length 
of railroads increased from 2,500 miles in 1923 to 4,700 miles in 1947.^ This focus 
on railroad construction was a practice inherited from the Ottoman Empire. The
Report About the Highway Situation in Turkey by American Highway Mission For Aid to Turkey, 
February 1948, RG 59, General Records of the Department o f State Records o f the Office of Greek, 
Turkish and Iranian Affairs, 1947- 56. Subject File: Turkey 1947- 50, Box 30, Folder: Highway 
 ^Yol Davamız, Bayındırlık Bakanlığı, Bayındırlık Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ankara, 1948, p. 13 
® Office Memo from H.J. Gumming, Director o f Near Eastern & African Affairs to Robert Moore, 
State Department, ‘Country Study o f Private Investment in Turkey’, October 9, 1950. RG 59, 
General Records of the Department o f State, Miscellaneous Lot Files, Lot File No 58 D 610, NARA. 
Subject Files Relating to Turkey, 1947-58, Box 2.
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main motivation behind the development of the railroads had been to increase 
the transportation capacity of the raw material seeking European states of Britain, 
Germany and France. In the construction of Turkish railways the European 
powers gained important concessions including profit guarantees and long-term 
management rights.’
A November 16, 1907 Secret Memo of Sir Edward Grey a high ranking 
official in the British Embassy in Germany reveals the European powers’ interests 
and their competition to gain more concessions. The memo detailed the 
commercial interests of Germany in the construction of the Baghdad Railway, as 
well as Britain’s economic and strategic concerns with the route in its relationship 
to India.^ However this was only one aspect related to the Ottoman transportation 
policy. Like the European powers, Ottoman state had strategic and security 
concerns with the railroads since these railroads were the most crucial means to 
transfer its soldiers. In this highly competitive international arena that 
concentrated on the construction of railways, highway construction was neglected.
The Ottomans defined “road” as a means to carry the army to the battle 
field. Pursuant to the Code for Roads and Gates ( Turuku Meabir Nizamnamesi) 
of 1866, road construction became the responsibility of the Ottoman central 
state.^ This led the administration to impose new duties on its subjects. In one 
article of this Code, all male citizens between the ages 18 and 60 were assigned 
the responsibility of working annually on the construction of roads. The
’ Kepenek, Gelişimi, Üretimi, Yapisiyla ve Sorunlariyla Türkiye Ekonomisi, p .l9  
 ^Secret Memo from Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Foreign Office, November 16 1907, Kenneth 
Bourne & Cameron Watt ,ed., British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series B; the Near and 
Middle East, Vol 18, University Publications of America, 1985.
® M. Babur, ed.. Cumhuriyetimizin 50. Yılında Karayollarımız, Ankara: Karayolları Genel 
Müdürlüğü: 1973, p. 168
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minimum age requirement was later amended to 16 and the distance to the 
construction field was set at a 12 hour maximum.
The 1882 Public Works Program prepared by Public Works Minister Hasan 
Paşa proposed a multidimensional transportation network. The idea of a 
highway network was first advocated in this program, which envisaged the 
construction of a total of 2,535 km of roads connecting Rize & Erzurum; 
Gümüşhane & Erzincan; Tirebolu & Karahisar; Giresun& Karahisar; Ordu & Sivas; 
Ünye & Tokat; Bafra 8c Terme; Sinop, Yozgat & Kayseri; Bartın 8c Safranbolu; 
Bandırma & Balıkesir; Ayvalık 8c Kırkağaç; Antalya 8c İsparta; Maraş, Adana & 
Karataş. These roads were conceived in the shape of the branches of a tree, 
connecting hinterlands to provincial capitals. Although this program was not put 
into effect^2 due to the financial shortage its existence proves that the Ottomans 
realized the importance of a network that would connect the country.
The regulations on road and bridge construction were amended in 1898 as 
the General Instructions for Roads and Gates (Turuku Meabir Talimati 
Umumiyesi). This document introduced a new method of road construction , the 
macadam technique, which consisted of pressing 3 to 5 cm ballast into a 20 to 25 
cm thick road surface.
As a result of these efforts the length of chausee roads reached 10,400 km 
in 1888 from a mere 900 km in 1881, 13800 km in 1898, and 17,400 km in 1908. 
In 1923 the Turkish Republic inherited 18,335 km of highways,13,885 km of which
10 ibid., 169
llllhan Tekeli & Selim ilkin, ‘ Osmanh İmparatorluğunda IQ.yy’da Araba Teknolojisinde ve 
Karayolu Yapımındaki Gelişmeler’ ,in. Ekmeddin İhsanoğlu, ed.. Çağını Yakalayan Osmanlı, 
İstanbul, 1995, p.395
1^  İlhan Tekeli & Selim İlkin, ‘The Public Works Program and the Development of Technology in 
the Ottoman Empire in the Second Half of 19"' Century’, in Turcica, Revue d’etudes Turques, 
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was ruined and in need of total repair, and 4,450 km of which were unpaved dirt
roads. 15
Transportation Policy o f  Turkey: Turkish Republic Era. Turkish Republic 
policy makers were not indifferent to the transportation problem. However, in the 
midst of a financial shortage they could do nearly nothing. The 1923 Public Works 
program , like its predecessors, gave priority to railway construction. This program 
considered highways to be a means of raising the efficiency of railroads, and 
necessary for short distances^®
Turkish Highway System by 1947. By 1947, the Turkish republic had 26,350 
miles of highways, equivalent to nearly 43.000 km, 4750 miles of which served only 
to connect the major urban centers (Table 5). Statistical data does not accurately 
reflect the situation, since roads were not passable in any real sense. Over 5,000 
miles, or 40 % of the national system, amounted to nothing more than dirt roads, 
ruts and trails, some of which were lightly and ineffectively strewn with loose 
gravel. Almost 3,750 miles were without any bridges, and another 2,325 miles 
bearing the remnants of macadam surfacing were negotiable by motor traffic at 
speeds of only 12 miles per hour or less. These conditions necessitated better and 
more regular road maintenance.^'^
15 Yol Davamız, p.lO
15 Ilhan Tekeli & Selim İlkin, 1923 Tarihli Umur-u Ñafia Programı, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 
1989, p. 1652,1656-7 
l^Hilts Report p. 18-9
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TABLE ND_5JaJRKISHJiIGHWAY.SYSTEM-_1947
J^aiionaLS.ystem __ ............................ _T2.370 miles
Asphalt, good condition 505
Passable Macadam 4.882
Ruined Macadam 2.325
Graded, with bridges }EARTH 1.250
Graded, without bridges}EARTH 1.603
Cart roads &: trails 2.165
Provincial Roads
Largely unsurfaced, in poor repair 13.İİ20....... . .
TOTAL 26.350 MILESİ8
Most of the rest of the national system, comprising some 4,882 miles of 
macadam roads, was in sufficiently better shape, that is “ they can be traveled at 
any season; but not in reasonable comfort and not without undue wear and tear 
on the vehicles.” Moreover due to the lack of snow-removal equipment, almost no 
Turkish road could be kept open to traffic throughout the winter months; and in 
spring a heavy rain could render much of the road system unusable.i^
Effects o f  Inadequate Turkish Transportation System. The data related to 
the era proved that this inadequacy affected every field of life, predominantly 
agricultural activity. 2® Every mile of constituted and repaired road would greatly 
benefit the rural population of the affected regions by facilitating the flow of their 
farm surpluses into domestic markets and export channels and reducing the 
shipping cost for grain.2i
In 1945 Turkey’s agricultural production was 2,189,318 metric tons on 
3,742,006 hectares. Some agricultural economists estimated that at letist 10% of 
Turkey’s wheat crop was lost each year because of a lack of highway transportation
Hilts Report p. 18-19 
Hilts Report, p. 18-9
Memo of Conversation between Mümtaz Rek, Director General of TMO and Gideon Hadary, 
Chief of Food and Agriculture Division, on Grain M ovement, March 27, 1952. RG 286, Records of 
the AID, NARA. Subject Files, Box 7, Folder: Commodities
Third Quarterly USTAP Report, Undated. RG 59 General Records o f the Department o f State, 
Miscellenous Lot Files, Lot File No. 58 D 610, NARA. Subject Files Relating to Turkey, Box.3.
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at times of harvest, storage and sale. It was estimated that when highway facilities 
became available to transport the grain, the wheat crop of Turkey would be 
increased by 75%. 22
As of 1948 less than 1/4 of the country’s arable lands were under 
cultivation. Yet there were crops which could not be marketed simply because 
transportation was unavailable.^^ Milton Katz, U.S. Special Representative in 
Europe, stated in a memo that in 1949, 50% of the nation’s food and vegetables 
went to waste for lack of storage and transportation. 24
Besides this waste of p roduct, the lack of transportation led to high costs, 
examples of which are numerous. When ismet İnönü became President in 1938 
the problem of transport was still such that Chinese rice was cheaper than Samsun 
rice on the Istanbul market. 25 The cost per ton mile of hauling grain by animal- 
drawn carts and other primitive methods of transportation was many times more 
than the cost of moving the same products by trucks. High costs of primitive 
transportation more than doubled the cost of bringing potatoes to the markets.26 
In 1947, the Head of the Chamber of Commerce in Mersin stated that the double 
handling of ship cargo at the pierless roadstead added 10% on the average to the
22 Report About the Highway Situation in Turkey by American Highway Mi.ssion For Aid to Turkey, 
February 1948, RG 59, General Records o f the Department o f State Records o f the Office of Greek, 
Turkish and Iranian Affairs, 1947- 56, NARA. Subject File: Turkey 1947- 50, Box 30, Folder: 
HighwayReport
25 Restricted Report by Ministry of Public Works, 1948 December. RG 469. Record o f the U.S. 
Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-61, NARA. Geographic Files Box 321, Folder: Transportation- 
Highways
24 Restricted Memo from from Milton Katz, U.S. Special Representative in Europe to EGA 
Administration, May 9,1950. RG 469 , Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948- 61, 
NARA. Geographic Files, Box 307, Folder: Turkey-Administrator.
25 Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the WWII, p.22
25 Restricted Report by Ministry of Public Works, 1948 December. RG 469. Record o f the U.S. 
Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-61, NARA. Geographic Files Box 321, Folder: Turkey- 
Administration.
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price of the articles shipped to and from that point. 7^
In addition to agriculture, other sectors of the economy would also benefit 
from improvements to the highway system, like mineral exploitation. Along with 
the regions that possessed considerable amount of mineral reserves there were 
nearly 500 small sized mining fields which could be utilized by small groups and 
individuals. Authorities stated that the estimated amount of exploitation from 
those small regions could be very high if they could be transferred to railroads 
and ports.2^
The bottleneck caused by lack of adequate transportation facilities could 
easily be exemplified in the exploitation of one important mineral, chromium. 
The government- owned and operated mine at Guleman was limited to the 
capacity of its transportation system. This could be remedied if existing highways 
were improved to carry heavy truck traffic on a year round basis.2  ^ Similarly 
inadequate transportation and loading facilities at the port of Zonguldak imposed 
a severe limitation on the expansion of coal production
Transportation deficiencies also hampered livestock and meat production. 
In 1949 death or weight loss to animals driven to market resulted in heavy 
financial losses. An increase in meat production could only be possible by 
increasing transportation capacity, including the use of cattle trucks for the 
Erzurum - Trabzon route and additional railroad cars for livestock from Eastern 
Turkey to Istanbul and to export destinations. Improvements to the Erzurum-
Restricted Memo from Herbert J. Gumming, Head of Near Eastern and African Division to 
Edward Lawson, American Embassy Economic Affairs Counselor July 10, 1947. RG 84, Foreign 
Service Posts o f the Department of State, NARA. Safehaven Files. Boxl , Folder: Turkey- Survey 
Group.
Vecdi Diker, A.B.D. Yol işlerinde Yapılan Tatkikat Hakkında Rapor, September 20, 1945.
Confidential Report by ECA Special Mission to Turkey, 6 August,1951. RG 84, Foreign Service 
Posts o f the Department o f State, NARA. Classified General Records. Box 58, Folder: ECA
Country Study by ERP. RG 59, General Records o f the Department o f State, Record o f the Office 
of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, NARA. Subject Files, Box 31.
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Trabzon road and Trabzon Harbor were defined as other crucial points that 
would benefit the livestock program.
The Turkish military also suffered from the inadequacy of the 
transportation network which was insufficient for an emergency. The movement of 
troops, equipment, food, fodder, animals and other supplies required a substantial 
part of the railway stock.^^^y long range reorganization of the Turkish army with 
a view to increasing mechanization and modernization while maintaining present 
strength would be limited by the very poor road network and inadequate rail 
communications.^^
Preparatory Studies for Highway Improvement Program. Even during the 
war years there were some efforts to diagnose and alleviate the prevailing 
conditions. In June 1942 the Public Works Ministry authorized a ten- year road 
program for 1943-1952 for the construction of new roads and improvement of the 
existing ones. In light of these considerations on March 22, 1945 two Turkish 
engineers, Vehbi Ekesan and Vecdi Diker, were sent to the U.S. to make surveys.
One of these engineers, Vecdi Diker, had been educated at Robert College 
in Istanbul and studied highway engineering at the University of Missouri. He was
^^Restricted letter o f the Nurullah Sümer, Turkish Minister of State to Russell Dorr, Head of 
American Special Mission to Turkey ,January 24, 1949. RG 469, Records o f the U.S. Foreign 
Assistance Agencies, NARA. Geographic Files, Box 321; Memo of the Conversation between Russell 
Dorr and Mr. Hugh Richwine, Food and Agriculture Officer in Aid Mission December 9 1949. RG 
286, Records o f the AID, Mission to Turkey, NARA. Subject Files, Box 4. Folder: Commodities 
1948- 49
Secret Report by Edward Lawson, American Emba.s.sy Economic Affairs Counsellor,“ Turkey’s 
Need for and Capacity to Services Further Foreign Loans’, December 26,1946. RG 286, Records of  
the AID, NARA. Classified Subject Files, Boxl. Folder: Loan Agreements.
Memo of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary o f War and Secretary of Navy, ‘Military 
Assistance to Turkey’, March 13,1947, Top Secret. FHUS 1947 
^  Babur, Cumhuriyetimizin 50. Yilnda Karayollarimiz, p .l78
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familiar with American highway developments through his work with the U.S. 
Highway Department.
During this trip, Diker and Ekesan conducted field research in areas which 
were regarded as crucial due to their organizations; their construction 
characteristics; their considerable construction success in a short time; and their 
geographical similarities to Turkey.^® Studies were made in New Jersey, North and 
South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Texas, California, Colarado, Kansas City, 
Missouri and Kentucky. The engineers focused on Colarado, Kansas and Missouri 
since their climate, terrain and soil conditions were roughly similar to Turkey . In 
the last month, Diker and Ekesan visited the most important factories for the 
production of road construction machines.^'^
The synthesis of this research found its expression in a report prepared by 
Diker and used as a guide by the Turkish officials at an Inter- Ministry Roads 
Conference in 1946.^  ^The aim of this conference was to create a highway policy. 
Acceptance of the obligation to construct a highway network and establishment of 
the cooperative Turkish- American Roads program were two outcomes of this 
crucial conference.з^ In this conference, the Turkish highway situation was 
examined and an improvement program was drawn up. '^*
Turkish Highway Improvement Program. The Turkish highways 
improvement program received its first allocation through the Greek- Turkish Aid 
Program. The reconstruction and rehabilitation of the roads, railroads, ports, and
Robert S. Lehman, ‘Building Roads and A Highway Administration in Turkey’ in Howard Teaf, 
Jr. and Peter Franck, ed.. Hands Across Frontiers: Case Studies in Technical Cooperation, Ithaca, 
N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1955, p.366
Diker, A.B.D. Yol İşlerinde Yapılan Tatkikat Hakkında Rapor, p.45. 
ibid.,
Robert Kerwin, ‘The Turkish Roads Program’in Middle East Journal: April 1 1950: 2, p. 197.
Oral History Interview with Vecdi Diker, Head Engineer o f Turkish Chausee and Bridges then 
first General Director of Turkish Highways Directorate, 31 Ocak 1997.
‘^ ‘^ Kerwin, ‘The Turkish Roads Program’ in Middle East Journal, p. 197.
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the Corinth Canal in Greece were within the scope of the program’s 
responsibility.^! Of the $ 100,000,000 aid allocated to Turkey, the utilization was as 
follows:
Ground Force
Air Force
Naval Force
Arsenal Development
HIGHWAY IMPROVEMENT
$ 48.500.000 
$ 26.750.000 
$ 14.750.000 
$ 5.000.000 
$ 5.000.000
Diker points out that in the original plan of the Turkish Aid program 
highway improvement was not a consideration. After the allocation was approved 
by the U.S. Congress, but before the arrival of the first American team to Turkey, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, William Clayton stated that this $ 
100,000,000 would be earmarked to the equipment for Turkish military and to
projects such as railroad improvement.^^
Diagnosis o f the situation by an American Team. The American team 
arrived in Turkey on May 22, 1947, under the guidance of General Lunsford 
Oliver of the War Department, for a three month period of field research. This 
team realized the inadequacies of the Turkish highways in the initial days of their 
stay. In a June 11, 1947 press conference Oliver mentioned Turkey’s need for 
military equipment in every field, adding that Turkey also very urgently needed 
improved highways, both for efficiency and for the integration of the country’s 
isolated areas, a crucial condition for the Turkish economy.·!^
Before his departure Oliver promised to do his best regarding the necessary 
allocation for the Turkish highways. However, this oral statement was not binding, 
since U.S. policy makers categorized aid for Turkish economic development
Letter from R.A. Wheeler, Lieutanant General chief o f Engineers to Styles Bridges, Chairman of 
Senate Appropriations Committee, 9 January 1948. RG 59, General Records o f the Department of 
State. Records of the Office o f Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, 1947- 56, NARA. Subject File, 
Box 30, Lot 24.
Cumhuriyet, 12 May 1947.
Cumhuriyet, 12June 1947; Aksam 12 June 1947;Vecdi Diker, 1 February 1997
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separately from military aid. Therefore, the most appropriate procedure to 
receive the economic aid was Turkey’s credit appeal to the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development Despite this policy General Oliver had a 
flexible approach to the Turkish highway improvement program.
Opposition to the program before its approval. When Oliver was replaced 
by General Horace Bride as the Head of the U.S. Aid Mission to Turkey in early 
September, this flexible approach ended. After this appointment the U.S. Military 
Mission refused any allocation from the Greek- Turkish Program for highway 
improvement on the grounds that this aid was not even sufficient to meet Turkish 
military needs. After this refusal Vecdi Diker , by then Head of the Department of 
Roads and Bridges, took the initiative in bringing the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads 
into the picture.·*^
Diker contacted Thomas MacDonald , a high ranking official in the 
Highway Department who was known as the ” prophet of the roads” in the U.S. 
However, MacDonald, after having had some bad experiences with the military 
during road construction in Alaska, was reluctant to participate in any work if the 
military was involved. ^®After this negative reply, Diker appealed to Herbert J. 
Gumming, Director of Near Eastern and African Division, one of the two civilian 
officials in the American team that arrived in Turkey for field research in 1947. 
With Cumming’s assistance, Diker enlisted strong support for his viewpoint on the 
allocation of the necessary amount^^.
The reluctance of the U.S. Military Mission to support a broad highway 
improvement program was one aspect of the difficulties. Diker claimed that the
Public Release o f Paul McGuire, a high rank official in the Near Eastern and African Division, 
Cumhuriyet, 9 August 1947.
^^Lehman, ‘Building Roads and A Highway Administration in Turkey’ in Teaf, Jr. and Franck, ed.. 
Hands Across Frontiers: Case Studies in Technical Cooperation, p. 405 
ibid, 
ibid.
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Turkish Military strongly opposed the idea of an improved highway network due 
to a deep-rooted fear of the Communist U.S.S.R and the possibility of espionage."*® 
According to their view, a good roads network made Turkey more vulnerable. 
They did not want roads reaching to the Turkish frontiers because they believed 
the existence of the roads would increase the chance of a successful attack. Instead 
of a network the Turkish military advocated some good roads in Central Anatolia 
in order to facilitate the defense of the country against an attack.^^
This strict stance of the Turkish military made negotiations obligatory. In a 
meeting with Mr. Muzaffer Tulsavug, Diker questioned the military’s vision of 
Turkey’s future and whether Turkey would be the country that was defined in the 
Serves Treaty. After long negotiations, the Turkish military realized the direct 
relation between Turkish military strength and a good transportation network.^** 
This claimed resistance of the Turkish military was contradictory to the 
advocacy of the founders of the Turkish Republic, who had suffered from the 
inadequacy of railways during the war, and insisted that Turkey must quickly 
construct railways to its frontiers.^*The change in the world conjuncture; the 
psychologically destructive effects of WWII; and an hysterical fear of communism 
could be the motivations behind such a resistance. This resistance, if any, could be 
explained in the same rationale as the Red Army’s tearing up of railroad tracks in 
Eastern Europe during WWII due to Stalin’s fear that any attack could come from 
the West.^2
Oral History Interview with Vecdi Diker, Head Engineer o f Turkish Chausee and Bridges then 
first General Director of Turkish Highways Directorate .January 31,1997.
ibid, ‘25"' Anniversary o f Highways’ , Head Article in the Karayolları Dergisi.
°**Oral History Interview with Vecdi Diker, Head Engineer o f Turkish Chausee and Bridges then 
first General Director of Turkish Highways Directorate .January 31,1997
Sami Guven, Türkiye’de Ulaşım Sistemi ve Karayolu Ulaştırma Kooperatifleri,, TODAIE, Sevinç 
Matbaası, Ankara, 1982, p. 67, 67n,68; Falih Rıfkı Atay, Çankaya, İstanbul; Doğan Kardeş, 1969, p. 
450
Thomas, ‘The Man & the Plan’ , p. 15
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Approval & Financing o f  the Program. After the first year of financing the 
highway improvement program, the Greek- Turkish Aid allocation was supplanted 
by assistance from the Economic Cooperation and Mutual Security Program. The 
Highway Improvement Agreement was signed on April 20, 1948 between the 
Turkish Ministry of Public Works and the American Public Roads Mission. The 
Turkish Cabinet authorized the National Highways Improvement program on 
August 8, 1948.53
Table 6 shows the U.S. Aid to Turkish Road Development, through June 30 
, 1952*:
TABLE N0.6: U.S. AID TO TURKISH ROAD DEVELOPMENT:
Total Assistance Authorized
UNDERJELJZ5_. 
$ 5.000.000
UNDER j;CA&MSA 
$ 18.845.000**
TOTAT.
$ 23.845.000
Expanded or Obligated as of 
June 30, 1952 $ 5.000.000 $ 16.767.000 $21,767,000
Technical Services ¡Salaries 
&: Expenses }
$ 1.361.000 
$ 1.100.000 1 $ 3.972.000
+ Ocean Freights
Material, Equipment & Supply
$ 1.511.000 
$ 3.900.000 $ 13.895.000 $ 17.795.000
Expenditures: Materials etc 
Shipped Before June 30,1952 $ 3.900.000 $ 13.073.000 $ 16.973.000
Obligations: Materials etc 
On Order Before June 30, 1952 - $ 822.000 $ 822.000
Unobligated As Of June 30,1952 - $ 2.078.000 $ 2.078.000
• SOURCES: Assistance under PL 75 estimated from data given in Project No. 15: Improvement 
of Turkish National Highway System Project (MSA, 1951) & from totals shown in EGA Monthly 
reports o f receipts o f materials, equipment and supplies. ECA-MSA Assistance data supplied by 
Audit & Accounts Branch, Bureau of Public Roads.
** During Fiscal Year 1953-MSA authorized an additional $ 8,311,000 bringing the ECA-MSA Total 
to $ 27.156.000 and total including PL 75 Assistance to $32,156,00054
53 Kerwin, ‘The Turkish Roads Program ’in Middle East Journal, p. 197.
^^Lehman, ‘Building Roads and A Highway Administration in Turkey’ in Teaf, Jr. and Franck, 
Hands Across Frontiers: Case Studies in Technical Cooperation, p.385
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The Highway Improvement Program was defined as a program which was 
subject to general policy determinations of the Department of State under the 
general supervision of the U.S ambassador to Turkey who was serving as a Mission 
chief.^^ H.E. Hilts, Head of the American Mission of Turkish Road Construction, 
clearly defined the objective of the Turkish highway program. Consistent with the 
consensus of both the U.S. and Turkish officials in the program, the aim should 
not be to build U.S. super highways, but to open up at minimum costs an efficient, 
all-weather road network to meet present and expected Turkish traffic 
requirements. These roads should be capable of improvement and expansion to 
accommodate heavier traffic.
This objective fit the criteria of the U.S. concept of “’program”. As Clark 
M. Clifford, a high ranking official in the State Department , pointed out the 
program must be directed primarily toward short- run recovery rather than long- 
run development; full use of existing or readily repairable capacity; and 
restoration of normal domestic and intra- European intercourse.^'^
Standards o f the Improved Highways. The outcome of this was a new low- 
standard road type, the transitory roads (geçit yollan). These roads were a means 
to attain short- run recovery, that is, full use of existing or readily repairable road 
capacity, and led towards the realization of the ultimate objective, not leaving even 
one province or town without roads. However, low construction cost and less 
reliance on machine work led to sacrifices in road standards.^®
Memo from the Department o f State to Public Roads Administration Regarding the Turkish 
Program. RG 59, General Records o f the Department o f State, Records o f the Greek, Turkish and 
Iranian Affairs, NARA. Subject File: Program Operators, Box 30, Lot 24.
^®Lehman, ‘Building Roads and A Highway Administration in Turkey’ in Teaf,. and Franck, ed.. 
Hands Across Frontiers; Case Studies in Technical Cooperation, p.372
^^Top Secret Summary of the Department’s Position on the Content of ERP, 26 August 1947, 
Papers of Clark Clifford. HTR, Student Research File, Box 6, Folder: Establishing the Marshall 
Plan.
ibid.; Cahit Tûtengil, İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları, İstanbul, 1961, p. 32
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In a Ministry of Public Works publication of 1948, construction of these 
roads were justified as follows:
“To reach the required technical level in the first road construction 
is an ultimate objective. In terms of finance however to attain the 
same level of quality for the highways , as a means to provide inter­
regional transportation in our vast country , is impossible. For that 
reason, we must construct roads suitable to today’s needs, as 
durable and numerous as possible.”^^
General Oliver confirmed this view. He said that in the initial phases, instead of 
constructing super highways, Turkey must concentrate on the construction of 
chausee, which would be cheaper in terms of construction and 
maintenance.®®These words reflected the consensual views of Turkish and U.S. 
officials, who aware of the limitations of the program recommended a practical 
approach, with roads that were low standard in comparison to the super highways 
of the U.S., but met the Turkish needs of the day.
This range of program necessitated “inspection and studies of the 
topography; present status of improvements and other physical aspects; economic 
studies of present and potential kinds and uses of improved highways particularly 
with reference to food production and national defense; preparation of estimates 
of costs of proposed improvements; methods and types of construction and their 
application to the active operations; a study of equipment and equipment 
maintenance shops; a study of required highway laboratory facilities, training of 
Turkish personnel.”
Yol Davamız, p. 20 
Cumhuriyet, 15 July 1947.
Restricted Memo of Herbert J. Gumming, Director o f Near East & African to Edward Lawson, 
American Embassy Economic Affairs Counselor, July 10, 1947. RG 84, Foreign Service Posts o f the 
Department o f State, NARA. Ankara Embassy, Safehaven Files, 1945- 48, Box 1, Folder: 850 Aid to 
Greece & Turkey, Survey Group.
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American Highway Advisory M ission & H ilts Report. Acting under 
Executive order 9857 the Secretary of State, designated the Public Roads 
Administration of the Federal Works Agency to assign the technical personnel 
necessary to establish a Highway Advisory Mission to Turkey. 2^ The staff of this 
road mission was selected by Diker and MacDonald , who after his initial 
reluctance acted as an expert to the Turkish highway improvement program
Staff members were recruited largely from areas in the Western part of the 
U.S. where because of the climatic and topographical similarities, problems and 
techniques of highway construction are much like those in Turkey.®  ^ This 
American Mission of Road Construction was headed by Deputy Commissioner of 
the Public Roads Administration, H. E. Hilts. Besides Hilts, Jesse E. Williams was 
appointed to head the office being established at Ankara as division engineer. In 
December 1947, the Road Mission consisted of specialists in various branches of 
highway work such as planning, financing, design, material testing, bridge 
construction , maintenance and equipment.®^ The Road Group grew from 20 
persons at the beginning of 1948, to a peak of over 50 in 1950, and contracted 
somewhat after that (Table 7). The Road Mission’s responsibilities were defined as 
contribution to the drafting of a new highway bill; training of Turks to 
competently operate American equipment; supervision of highway construction; 
and daily contact of Mission engineers with the Turkish staff, who were rapidly 
assimilating American methods of construction and design.®^
ibid.
Oral History Interview with Vecdi Diker, Head Engineer o f Turkish Chausee and Bridges then 
first General Director of Turkish Highways Directorate .January 31, 1997.
®'*Lehman, ‘Building Roads and A Highway Administration in Turkey’ in Teaf,. and Franck, ed.. 
Hands Across Frontiers: Case Studies in Technical Cooperation, p.375
Telegram Regarding Mission of Road Construction, from USINFO to American Embassy in 
Ankara,28 November 1947. RG 84, Foreign Service Posts o f the Department o f State, Confidential 
Files, NARA.
Third Quarterly USTAP Report, Undated. RG 59,General Records of the Department of State, 
Miscellenous Lot Files, Lot File No. 58 D 610, NARA. Subject Files Relating to Turkey, Box.3.
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TABLE N0..7:_TYPEJc_I^UMBERi3JE.EERS0NNEL_0FjmEXUmSH ROA^
Type o f Personnel # o f Persons_______________ ____
_JanJL9T8_ Jan 1Q49_ Jan.I9_50_JaiLİ9ai_Jan_1355
11 12 12 11 10
- - 12 13 11
7 13 21 9 12
2 7 8 6 7
20 32 53 39 4067
Engineers 
Equipment Sc Shop 
Superintends &: Foremen 
Equipment Specialized Sc 
Instructors 
Administrative 
TOTAL
On February 26, 1948 after four months of surveying existing conditions, 
the American Road Mission transmitted a report to Kasim Gülek, Turkish Minister 
of Public Works. The report, known as the Hilts Report, was entitled Turkey’s 
Road Situation and listed detailed information on the current state of Turkish 
highways. The suggestion was that Turkey must have an approximately 35,000 km 
network of all- weather roads, suitable for motor vehicle use in all possible 
weather conditions®^, connecting all densely populated centers.®^ This was 75% 
greater than the length of the current Turkish network in 1948, and was set as a 
long term objective . However, before this long- term objective could be met a 
21,000 km network of national highways, which would connect the important 
market centers, was determined as high priority.'^®
Turkish highways were divided into several administrative groups: first, the 
national highway system consisting of first priority arteries connecting important 
regions and cities, rail, sea and air stations, and harbors ; second, the roads
Lehman, ‘Building Roads and A Highway Administradon in Turkey’ in Howard Teaf, Jr. and 
Peter Franck, ed.. Hands Across Frontiers: Case Studies in Technical Cooperation, p.373
Telegram Regarding Mission o f Road Constniction, from US INFO to American Embassy in 
Ankara,28 November 1947. RG 84, Foreign Service Posts o f the Department o f State, Confidential 
Files, NARA.
®^ Babur, ed.. Cumhuriyetimizin 50. Yılında Karayollarımız, p.l81.
Report About the Highway Situation in Turkey by American Highway Mission For Aid to Turkey, 
February 1948, RG 59, General Records of the Department o f State Records o f the Office of Greek, 
Turkish and Iranian Affairs, 1947- 56, NARA. Subject File: Turkey 1947- 50, Box 30, Folder: 
Highway Report
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administered by cities, consisting of second priority roads within city boundaries 
;and third, the provincial highway system, which included all the roads outside of 
the national and city highway network.'^iThe Hilts report defined the 
improvement of the national highway system as the first priority^2
Selection o f High Priority Roads. The program was estimated to last nine 
years. Due to factors including shortage of time and equipment , the Mission 
defined 6,295 km of high- priority roads within the 21,638 km national highways 
system. These roads were crucial as an arterial framework giving extensive access 
to major cities, ports, and areas of important production.'^^Moreover, these 
selected high- priority routes would enhance the advantageous geographical 
location of Turkey, not only connecting Turkey to Europe through the Istanbul- 
Edirne route to Bulgaria, as a junction of ‘London Asphalt’, but also reviving 
traditional east-west and north-south inter societal trade routes.'^^
Turkish officials believed that the highway improvement program could 
provide the ultimate benefit through the wise exploitation of Anatolia’s bridge like 
stance between two important continents. The traditional east- west route was 
divided into two branches. The northern branch of this road crossed Anatolia 
through Ankara- Sivas- Erzincan- Erzurum and reached as far as Tabriz. The
Babur, ed., Cumhuriyetimizin 50. \51inda Karayollanmiz, p. 85- 6,90
Confidendal Map Showing Desires o f Various Groups in the Priorities of Importance o f the 
Nadonal Highway System of Turkey, from Jesse Williams, Division Engineer to George Wadsworth, 
American Ambassador to Turkey, 21 October 1949. RG 286, Records of the AID, NARA. Classified 
Subject Files, Box 10, Folder: Roads 1949- 51. 
ibid
^^Oral History Interview with Vecdi Diker, Head Engineer of Turkish Chausee and Bridges then 
first General Director o f Turkish Highways Directorate , 31 January 1997
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southern branch of this route was connected Denizli to Konya and Kayseri _in 
Central Anatolia, to Malatya and Elazig in the Eastern region, and ultimately to 
Baghdad. This East- West route culminated at the Mediterranean sea where it then 
linked with the overseas trade routes. (Attached Map 1). The North- South trade 
route connected Russia both to North Africa and to the Near Eastern Arab Islamic 
lands, (signed no.l in the attached map )
To realize the dream of the revival of the traditional trade routes and the 
international dimension Turkish officials began to negotiate with Iran. In 1948- 
1949 mutual visits by Turkish and Iranian teams provided the necessary official 
connection for the construction of the important roads of Hakkari- Yüksekova- 
Esendere - Iran, Van- Özalp- Khvoy ,and Erzurum-Dogubeyazit-Iran'^®
In a secret telegram of December 8,1949, George McGhee informed the 
State Department of the Iranian Foreign Minister’s favorable belief regarding a 
possible agreement on the opening of a trade route between Azarbaijan and the 
sea. This would provide a transit route for Turkish and Iranian trucks from Tabriz 
to Trabzon, or, by trucks to Erzurum then by train to İskenderun. The Iranian 
Foreign Minister noted the expectations of alleviating the Soviet economic 
pressure on Northern Iran.' '^  ^The above mentioned routes directly served to this 
end.
^^azicioglu, Dependent Urban Development & Non- Reciporocal City & Countryside Relations in 
Developing Countries: A Case Study o f the Turkey, p .103-4.
Oral History Interview with Vecdi Diker, Head Engineer o f Turkish Chausee and Bridges then 
first General Director o f Turkish Highways Directorate , 31 January1997.
Secret Telegram from George McGhee, then Assistant Secretary for Middle East to American 
Embassy in Ankara, 8 December 1949. RG 84, Foreign Service Posts o f the Department of State, 
NARA. Confidential File, Box 45, Folder: Political Relations.
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These high priority roads would be improved in the first three years of the 
overall nine- year program Table 8 shows the high priority roads as determined by 
the improvement program:
TABLEJm^8:_HIGJdTRLOJBITOLQAD.SJ3TT_URKISHJ^ATLOJSiAL.HIGRWAY_SYSTT^
NAME_OF THE_RO_miL
I&tanhulzJBeypazarkAnkara
Ankara-Aksaray-Tarsus;
MersiEL-Xaprakkale:
Ankara=JEskisehir-Izmir:
GeyyjeXskisehirAjfyjcmzAntaLy^ ^
BaiLdirma^Manisa:
KalaycLoglu-BoiifcAnkara.
Yenicağr_Zongukiak:_
Konya-Kulir_dunctkui):_ 
Ankara-YozgaJtErzincan:.
ElazığJingoh_Mu§:
_______ CQNNECTED.REGIQNS/_INnUSIRIES:
Links capital city and surrounding area to the ports of 
the greatest economic, military and tourist value, 
including İzmit and Istanbul, facilitadng the transport of 
import export goods and internal trade; part of the 
transcontinental routes between Europe, Asia and 
Africa.
Links the central Anatolian cereals, fruits, catde, dairy 
centers to important ports like, Mersin and İskenderun. 
This road is also part of transcontinental route between 
Europe, Asia and Africa
Links the ports o f Mersin and İskenderun crossing 
richest cotton growing region of Turkey,
Linking agricultural and economic center between 
central Anatolia and Izmir ,
Links the centers like İsparta, Burdur and Antalya, 
crosses the fertile localities, links central Anatolia to the 
Mediterranean ports.
Links Aegean agricultural regions to ports of Izmir and 
Marmara through the port of Bandirma to the Istanbul 
market.
Links the tobacco, fig and cotton producing Southern 
and southwestern central plateau region with the ports of 
Izmir on the west 8c Antalya on the East
Links agricultural and forest regions making the 
transport o f timber and agricultural products possible to 
Istanbul port &: to Central Anatolia possible.
Links Zonguldak coal basin to the interior, makes 
supply to coal fields from the Bolu forests possible,
Links the corn- rich regions Konya &:Afyon to the 
ports of Mersin 8c İskenderun,
Connects corn producing regions of Konya and 
Cihanbeyli and provides access to rural transportation, 
Links Eastern region to Central Anatolia and the West, 
the shortest link between Istanbul 8c the East; explorable 
minerals lie along the route,
Links important Black Sea port of Samsun to Ankara 8c 
central Anatolia ,crossing cereals rich region.
Links agricultural centers, connects them to the 
İskenderun port; aid distribution o f goods produced in 
Kayseri and Sivas factories throughout the country.
Links the main centers of a region rich in agricultural 
products, particularly the live-stocks. For the first time 
beef, cotton &: products out of ranges and valleys of the 
Lake Basin could be shipped.
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Bahce-Gaziantep-Urfa-Diyarhakır: Links rich agricultural 8c livestocks producing regions
to İskenderun port.
In addition, a network of 7,011 km of national highway secondary priority 
roads would supplement and extend the usefulness of the first priority roads.'^^
Establishm ent o f Highway Districts .After the adoption of the improvement 
program, national highways division offices and districts were founded, which were 
essential for the continuation of the program. Before then field work had been 
seriously hampered by over centralization. Almost all engineers and technical 
personnel were stationed in Ankara. Hilts’ Report proposed the immediate 
establishment of 10 divisional offices with a Division Engineer at the head of each 
office and three to seven district offices under qualified engineers within each 
division. This was a model based on the Field Organization plan of the Bureau of 
Public Roads.^^ In consideration of the limited amount of funds and urgency of 
the attainment of the program the number of these districts, or division offices 
were limited to ten . The headquarters of these division offices were: Istanbul, 
Izmir, Konya, Ankara, Mersin, Kayseri, Samsun, Elazig, Diyarbakir and Trabzon.^^
Restricted Report by Ministry of Public Works, 1948 December. RG 469. Record of the U.S. 
Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-61, NARA. Geographic Files Box 321, Folder: Transportation- 
Highways ; Restricted Report by Russell Dorr, Chief o f Mission, 7 February 1949. RG 469. Records 
of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948- 61, NARA. Geographic Files, Box 321. Folder: 
Turkey- Transportation.
Confidential Map Showing Desires of Various Groups in the Priorities o f Importance of the 
Narional Highway System of Turkey, from Jesse Williams, Division Engineer to George Wadsworth, 
American Ambassador to Turkey, October 21, 1949. RG 286, Records of the AID, NARA. Classified 
Subject Files, Box 10, Folder: Roads 1949- 51.
Lehman, ‘Building Roads and A Highway Administration in Turkey’ in Teaf, Jr. and Franck, ed.. 
Hands Across Frontiers: Case Studies in Technical Cooperation, p.381
^^Report About the Highway Situation in Turkey by American Highway Mission For Aid to Turkey, 
February 1948, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State Records of the Office of Greek, 
Turkish and Iranian Affairs, 1947- 56, NARA. Subject File: Turkey 1947- 50, Box 30, Folder: 
Highway Report
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Training Program o f Turkish Citizens. Defining the highway improvement 
program only in terms of financial resources and supply of road construction 
machines narrows its meaning. Besides these considerations, the training of 
Turkish citizens in all branches of highway work , from skilled laborer to highway 
engineer was one of the olgectives of this improvement program. The Mission was 
to man construction jobs completely by Turkish nationals.^2
f
Training of Turkish nationals as skilled laborer had been a controversial 
issue. As well as some U.S. Mission officials, Kasim Giilek, then Turkish Minister of 
Public Works, insisted on the use of outside contractors from the U.S on the 
grounds that Turkey did not have time to wait for the training of Turkish 
nationals. They claimed that their view was legal pursuant to the Article 7 of the 
Agreement, which stated that,
“ In order further to expedite the immediate highway 
construction program the American Mission for Aid to 
Turkey ( Public Roads Group), with the prior approval of the 
Ministry of Public Works , may enter general construction 
contracts with qualified private U.S. contractors....”
Hilts, and others, however, insisted on training Turkish nationals in order 
to ensure that there would be skilled people in the country to provide the 
necessary continuity, maintenance and systematic study required for the Mission’s 
success.®^
^^Telegram Regarding Mission of Road Construction, from USINFO to American Embassy in 
Ankara,28 November 1947. RG 84, Foreign Service Posts o f the Department o f State, NARA. 
Confidential Files.
Oral History Interview with Vecdi Diker, Head Engineer o f Turkish Chausee and Bridges then 
first General Director o f Turkish Highways Directorate , 15 May 1996.
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Those in support of a training program, pointed out that the reluctance of 
the U.S. Mission to accept the responsibility for at least initial training could result 
in equipment wasted due to inadequately trained staff. According to Marshall, 
Turkey was not prepared to receive such large quantities of equipment due to the 
lack of a system of supply from the port to the interior; lack of trained personnel 
to inaugurate a system which would assure that equipment’s accurate distribution 
and security; and lack of adequate supervisory personnel to initiate training in the 
field of supply and logistics. ·^*
This shortage of manpower was also a prevailing fact in hand labor. The 
estimation of the total hand labor available for road construction would average 
only 40,000 men . Finding permanent road workers was a problem. Thus, the 
source of supply was primarily agricultural workers who inclined to work at most 
only one month to 45 days.^^
In support of the establishment of a training program. Hilts prepared and 
submitted the paper. Transformation o f Turkish Highways to the Turkish Public 
Ministry in December 1948. Hilts argued that the newness of the equipment to 
Turkey and the lack of Turkish operators and mechanics presented a problem for 
the American Mission for Road Construction, whose program required a high 
degree of maintenance and improvement^^ in order to be successful. In the 
conclusion Hilts mentioned the importance of the nationwide extension of the
Information From Edward D Marshall, Colonel USAF to George Wadsworth, American 
Ambassador to Turkey, 19 November 1947. RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, 
NARA. Records o f the Office o f Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, Subject File; Program 
Operators, Box 30, Lot 24.
Confidential Memo of Conference on Roads, 14 April 1947. RG 84, Foreign Service Posts o f the 
Department o f State, NARA. Turkey- Confidential File, Box 28, Folder; 815.4.
Paper submitted to Nihat Erim, Turkish Public Works Minister, 10 December 1948. RG 84, 
Foreign Service Posts o f the Department of State, NARA. Turkey, Ankara Embassy, Confidential 
File ,Box 38. Folder; 1948 Highways.
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pilot training program in İskenderun.^^ At the end the sides reached a consensus 
on the necessity of this training program.
Political Pressures D uring Program’s Im plem entation. The highway 
improvement program could not be implemented exactly as planned due to 
external pressure and political interference. From its inception, there has been 
pressure from many Turkish communities who wanted a higher priority assigned 
to the one road that happened to be important to them, or who wanted the 
program amended to include a road that would serve their particular interest. To 
attain their goals these people appealed to the deputies in the Grand National 
Assembly. These deputies pressed continually for the allocation of a larger share of 
highway resources to their districts.®®
The Turkish highways improvement program commenced in the strategic 
port of İskenderun .The importance of İskenderun to Turkey became most 
obvious during WWII, when the Axis occupation of Greece and some of the 
Aegean islands effectively closed the Turkish straits to Allied shipping. Lend-lease 
shipments to Turkey were discharged at the ports of İskenderun and Mersin. For 
this the Turks constructed a railroad pier , with British aid, capable of serving 
ocean- going vessels in the harbor.®® In consideration of a possible a sudden 
attack from the U.S.S.R. In the future, military equipment could be carried on 
this road.
®^ When Hilts submitted this Report, the Turkish Public Works Minister was no longer Kasim 
Gulek, but his successor , Nihat Erim. The acceptance o f the training program would most 
probably not have occured if Gülek was still the Public Works Minister. Moreover, ‘“the program 
for training Turkish nationals proved in actuality to be a great success in a short time. After appeals 
by Middle East countries to the U.N. Technical Aid Organization , the U.N. Ankara Highways 
Training Center was established in 1954. In its first year of operation this center trained Iranian, 
Lebanese, Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanians in the field of highway construction”, from Tûtengil, 
içtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Tûrkiyenin Karayolları, p. 103.
®®Lehman, ‘Building Roads and A Highway Administration in Turkey’ in Teaf, Jr. and Franck, ed.. 
Hands Across Frontiers: Case Studies in Technical Cooperation, p.405.
®^ Central Intelligence Group, Hatay Question, 28 February 1947. President’s Secretary’s Files. 
HTR. Intelligence File, Box 54 Folder: ORE-1947.
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In addition to its strategic importance, İskenderun was important also in 
terms of economics. Construction of good roads in the İskenderun vicinity was of 
considerable importance since this was fruit, olive, grain, tobacco, cotton-growing 
and silk- cultivating country.^*’
Economic Sc M ilitary Priorities o f the Program. This intertwined nature of 
the economic and military priorities was not an exception for İskenderun , but an 
obvious characteristic of the improvement program. Rather than a separation of 
these two objectives, the program envisioned a complementary relationship in 
which priorities could be revised in a practical manner according to fluctuations in 
the world picture. The Korean War is an outstanding example of such a practical 
approach.
The Korean War played a distinctive role in the policy shift from economic 
considerations to military ones. In a secret memo, dated 24 August 1951, the first 
point discussed weis revised EGA directives. This required current and future EGA 
programs to be formulated in such a way that the paramount emphasis would be 
the support of defense requirements , both direct and indirect. Indirect projects 
were defined as improvement of the railroads, rail equipment, and highway 
network throughout Turkey. From that time on any steps that were taken to 
expedite highway network progress would be considered beneficial to military.
Prevailing conditions forced the policy makers to carefully consider the 
integration and development of the highways with other transportation systems. 
The postwar improvement and construction policy had advocated a
ibid.
Memo o f General Arnold, the Mtyor General, U.S. Chief of EGA Special Mission to Turkey, 
‘Coordination of EGA Investment Plans with Defense Requirements in Turkey’, August 24, 1951. 
RG 84, Foreign Service Posts of the Department o f State, NARA. Ankara Embassy, Classified 
General Records, 1950- 52. Folder: Financial Matters, General, 1951.
Transformation of Turkish Highways, Paper submitted to Nihat Erim, Public Works Minister by 
Hilts, 10 December 1948. RG 84 Foreign Service Posts of the Department o f State, NARA. Ankara 
Embassy. Confidential Files, Box 38 Folder: 851-A 1948.
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complementary and supportive relationship between different systems of 
transport. In order to achieve a real benefit from the construction program there 
must be correlation among each facility.^з The newly adopted transportation 
policy’s predominant stress on the highway network represented a total shift in 
Turkish transportation policy.
Before the allocation for the highways improvement program , the 
American team, headed by General Oliver, from the Department of Defense, 
traveled every part of Turkey. This team carefully examined the situation in the 
field with respect to mileage constructed; present and potential tonnage; 
passenger movements and operating procedures. It concluded that there was no 
pressing need for the extension of the railroad system, except in the Eastern 
region of Anatolia.^^
The Turkish Investment Team Report regarding the highway situation in 
Turkey justified highway construction from various aspects. Highway construction 
did not necessitate a complete investment and in contrast to railroads, which 
serviced only beginning and endpoints could serve all points on route. This 
benefit was of particular importance in sparsely settled area “due to its stimulating 
effect on production and marketing.” Nonetheless, the logic behind the 
complementary policy was that different facilities had different roles. While
Note to General Horace L. McBride, Chief o f U.S. Army Group of American Mission in Turkey, 
9 October 1947. RG 59 General Records o f the Department o f State. Office o f the Greek, Turkish 
and Iranian Affairs, NARA. Subject File: Program Operations Box 30.
Report About the Highway Situation in Turkey by American Highway Mission For Aid to Turkey, 
February 1948, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State Records o f the Office o f Greek, 
Turkish and Iranian Affairs, 1947- 56, NARA. Subject File: Turkey 1947- 50, Box 30, Folder: 
Highway Report
Airgram About Turkish Investment Team Report, 6 December 1950. RG 286, Records of the 
AID, Mi.ssion to Turkey, NARA. Subject Files, Box 48. Folder: Investment Team
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railroads were favorable for transporting greater volumes of commodities, 
highways were favorable for passenger - km costs and door to door services.^®
Highway Im provem ent Between 1947&1951,1955. Table 9 shows the 
improvement to primary and secondary highway systems between 1947 and 1951. 
This represented a gain of almost 20% in the mileage of the national system.^^ 
TABLE No.9: COMPARISON OF TURKISH ROAD LENGTH, 1949 & 1951:
1947 1951
Surface Type Miles % of Totals Miles % of1
Black Stone 63 - 111 1
Portland Cement 5 - 7 -
Bituminous Concrete 
Bituminous
179 1 216 1
Surface Treated 372 1 681 2
Macadam( Good) 6705 26 7010 25
Macadam (Bad) 4711 18 4218 14
Gravel - - 2891 10
Graded-Drained Earth 3059 12 2205 7
Graded Only Earth 4715 18 4239 14
Cart Roads 5452 21 6529 22
Trails 1089 3 1318 4
In comparison to 1948 , when Turkey’s road length was 17 meters per km2 
area, by 1955 it had increased to 60 meters. This represented a 353% increase, 
greater than any other European country ( Table 10). This was a great stride, but 
not sufficient. Turkey had to work for long years with this momentum.
Report About the Highway Situation in Turkey by American Highway Mission For Aid to Turkey, 
February 1948, RG 59, General Records o f the Department o f State Records o f the Office of Greek, 
Turkish and Iranian Affairs, 1947- 56, NARA. Subject File: Turkey 1947- 50, Box 30, Folder: 
Highway
Lehman, ‘Building Roads and A Highway Administration in Turkey’ in ed. Teaf, Jr. and Franck, 
p. 403
Tûtengil, İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları, p. 27
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L-RQAILLENGTH IN MEXERS.IN.RELATIONSHIE.IÛj^A^(EER JÎM)
Country:______________ Road_Length_(l)y_Meters)
England 1240
France 1306
Germany 707
Rumania 750
Bulgaria 436
Yugoslavia 320
Greece 197
TURKEY 60
1948 Wiis a cornerstone in the highways improvement and construction 
history of Turkey, when in comparison with preceding years, observable changes 
were experienced in highway construction. Between the years 1948 and 1956 there 
was improvement of the permanent roads through maintenance, repair and 
asphalting; and construction of appropriate roads in the regions without roads 
and old routes with heavy traffic.^® The transport policy was redefined and a 
transition to mechanized construction was begun.
Revolutionary Aspect o f the Program. Revolution of 1948, the 
mechanization of highway construction, divides the road construction history of 
the Republican era into a pre-1948 manual work era (kazmali çalisma) and a post- 
1948 mechanized road construction program.^^’i Before 1948 the maintenance of 
the roads was not a concern. After this date, however, it wzis understood that to 
make construction efforts worthwhile permanent maintenance of the roads was 
necessary.
Along with transitory roads, another characteristic of the new road 
construction philosophy was the staged construction system (kademeli inşaat 
sistemi). According to this system, the standard quality of a road was decided by 
the volume of traffic on that road. Adaptability of payment by road users was
®®Babur, ed., Cumhuriyetimizin 50. Yılında Karayollarımız, p.l88  
l^ibid., 183 
101 ibid.
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another novel aspect. The tax on fuel; the road tax from benzine; and the 
customs tariff on fuels are examples of this new type of understanding.i'’^
On February 11, 1950, pursuant to the legislation No. 5539, the Turkish 
Highways General Directorate, referred to as the Roads General Directorate in the 
Hilts Report, was founded. Thus, in 1950 , along with the new highways policy that 
commenced with the motto of "let’s work to turn the wheel’’ the road 
construction which initially depended on manual labor was replaced by 
mechanized road construction which would serve to the structurally change roads 
that had initially been designed to carry chariots into ones fit for automobiles and
trucks.
The Turkish Highways General Directorate had an essential place in 
Turkish bureaucratic systems. In the words of Mr. Vecdi Diker it was the idealistic 
"Karayolcu Spirit”, that served this improvement. It was a challenge to stagnant 
bureaucratic understanding. Instead of waiting for somebody for salvation the 
Karayolcus endeavored to create suitable conditions for themselves and their 
country.
Agricultural M echanization Program. To reconstruct the highways system 
of a country which inherited only 18, 835 km. road length from the Ottoman 
Empire was a drastic revolution. The key to this revolution was the mechanization 
of highway construction. At the same time, another ‘mechanization’ program was 
in its initial phases, that of agricultural mechanization. These two programs were 
defined as the most important means for the Turkish economy’s transition from 
import- substitution to a more open, liberal economic policy.
ibid.
ibid
Oral History Interview with Vecdi Diker, Head Engineer o f Turkish Chausee and Bridges then 
first General Director of Turkish Highways Directorate , 23 May 1996.
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In 1947 after evaluating product ratios, population growth, and future 
estimates the President’s Committee on Foreign Aid found it necessary to treat 
the food supply problem in two distinct stages: first, the critical 1947- 48 period 
during which supplies in the Northern hemisphere must come from crops already 
harvested; second, the longer-range 1948-51 period during which policies could be 
carried out to increase the production and availability of essential foods not only 
in the participating countries and Western Germany , but elsewhere throughout 
the world.
Turkey was a logical choice because it was the only country where land 
resources and climatic conditions offered the possibility of significant increases in 
agricultural production. It was only Turkey where large areas of hitherto 
uncultivated land could be brought into p roduct ion .Turkey ,  which had the 
potential of supporting 60 million
instead of 20 million was seen as a ’breadbasket’ for Western Europe.
Low Agricultural Productivity , Inadequate Transportation Sc 
M echanization Relation. The 1947 Development Plan, or Turkish Recovery 
Program defined the precondition for agricultural development as the 
improvement of the infrastructure , especially that of the highway system. It was 
stated that,“ the success of the agricultural development plan relied first of all on 
filling up of vacuums and the improvement and recovery of the current roads and 
vehicles in the Turkish transportation s y s t e m . L a c k  of good transportation
Confidential Memo on the Prospects of European Recovery under the Marshall Plan by 
Professor K. Varvaressos, Executive Director o f IBRD, 6 April 1948. Papers of Dean Acheson. 
Political and Governmental file, HTR. Marshall Plan, Box 5 Folder: Reports, ERP, 1948.
Report o f American Postwar Economic Assistance Programs to Turkey , 27 February 1950. RG 
59, General Records of the Department o f State, Records o f Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, 
NARA. Subject File: Air-Water, Box 38 Lot 54 D 363.; Bahattin Aksit, Köy, Kasaba ve Kentlerde 
Toplumsal Değişme, Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi, 1985, p. 30 
ibid.
^^ I^lhan Tekeli & Selim ilkin. Savaş Sonrası Ortamında 1947 Türkiye İktisadi Kalkınma Planı, 
Ankara: ODTU,1974,p.l6.
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facilities , mainly highways , was the most distinctive factor of Turkey’s being one 
of the countries that practice traditional subsistence agriculture. The direct 
repercussion of the inadequacy in transportation was the dual problem of getting 
agricultural products from the farm to the consumer , and goods , both imported 
and locally manufactured, to the towns and villages.^ ®®
In the Survey on Turkey: Turkey on Economic Appraisal, Max W. 
Thornburg, an American foreign industrial consultant working for private 
campaigns ,declared that the means of travel and communications were so 
slender that instead of one Turkey there were actually 100- or 1,000- little 
Turkey’s . Since there were 40,000 villages in Turkey, this meant there were 
40,000- little Turkey’s.^ i®
This inability to move products resulted in low productivity as farmers 
lacked the incentive to produce more . Moreover, it prevented villages from 
communicating easily with each other and made them fragmented. Isolation of 
the peasants from the influence of new knowledge and more modern ideas 
minimized their ability to take part in development of public policies. Thus, the 
policy makers concluded that the over-all plans for Turkish agricultural expansion 
were dependent upon the development of an adequate all-weather highway system 
with a tributory secondary and farm-to-market road system.^i^
Good transportation is an essential, but not the sole, means to achieve high 
productivity. Mechanization of agriculture was considered a prerequisite for a
Excerpt From Public Statement Regarding Turkey by James H. Smith, Director o f EGA, Secret. 
RG 59 General Records of the Department o f State Miscellenous Lot Files. Lot File No 58 D 610, 
NARA. Subject Files Relating to Turkey Box 3.
Frederick W. Frey, ‘Political Development, Power and Communications in Turkey’ cited from 
Max Thornburg’s Survey on Turkey: Turkey on Economic Appraisal, 20"’ Century: 1949, p. 18 in 
ed. Lucian W Pye Communications and Political Development, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1963, p. 305.
^^^Restricted Memo from L.H. Mattingly, Chief o f Project Analysis, to George H. Knutson, 
Executive Chairman of Projects Committee, 21 March 1949. RG 469 Records of the U.S. Foreign 
Assistance Agencies, NARA. Geographic Files, Box 321. Folder: Turkey- Transport.
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significant increase of agricultural production as well. Mechanization included 
better farming practices promoted through an extension service; range land 
improvement through seed and deferred grazing; a new understanding of farm 
management technologies; use of more fertilizers; irrigation; and development of 
new land within the country.i^^ This agroeconomic development meant a change 
in the agricultural structure as a result of an attempt to secure increased 
production.
In general, mechanization in an underdeveloped country affected the 
whole economic and social structure, changing primitive self- sufficient 
production into a complex agricultural system.i^^ In Turkey farm mechanization 
was the turning point in Turkish rural history and provided the basis for future 
large- scale social and political developments.
D eterm ined Goal o f Agricultural M echanization. The farm mechanization 
program was developed at the request of the Turkish government as one means of 
attaining production goals set in conjunction with the OEEC. The determined 
goal of this mechanization program was increasing cereal grain production to 
10,300,000 tons by 1952 & increasing cotton fiber production to 100,000 tons.
After evaluating the objectives of this project ECA agreed that it was worthy 
of assistance. The scope of this mechanization program could be judged by 
comparison. The Summerville report, submitted by an American team headed by
Memo Regarding the Pari.s Food and Agriculture Meeting, held on 1 May to 3 1950, from Hugh 
Richwine , Food and Agriculture Division Officer o f Aid Mission to Russsell Dorr, Chief of 
American Mission in Turkey, 9 May 1950. RG 286 Records o f AID, Mission to Turkey, NARA. 
Subject Files 1948- 56. Box 4, Folder; Agriculture.
Reşat Aktan, ‘ Mechanization o f Agriculture in Turkey’ in Land Economics, 1957 November, 
Vol. XXXIII, No. 4, p. 273.
Kemal Karpat, ‘Social Effects of Farm Mechanization in Turkish Villages’ in Societal Research, 
Volume 27, 1960, p. 83.
Memo from Pine to Richwine, Food and Agriculture Division Officer o f Aid Mission regarding 
Farm Equipment Program, 26 March 1951. RG 286 Records of the AID. Mission to Turkey, NARA. 
Subject Files 1948-53, Box 5. Folder: Agriculture Commodities.
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an agricultural expert, stated that in 1933 there were about 1,000,000 wooden 
plows, 250,000 steel plows, 3,500 seeders, 7,030 reapers and 590 binders, an 
occasional combine and a few tractors available in Turkey. Table 11 indicates 
the tractor and agricultural equipment situation as of December 1, 1951:
TABLEJslDJLb
BYT)JECEMBEBT,JL95JL:
Tractor:
Number of tractors in Turkey: 
Number of tractors sold:
Number o f tractors on hand: 
Number of tractors on order: 
TracLorJPlaw:
Number of tractor plows in Turkey: 
Number of tractor plows sold: 
Number of tractor plows on hand:
Number of tractor plows on order:
.& AGRICULTURAL EQUIEMENT INJIIRKEY
6752
6665
85
688
9704
9353
351
10117
Procedures o f the Program. The procedures of the farm machinery 
program were determined as soon as the project was accepted by the EGA. 
According to the policies of sale and financing of farming equipment, a purchase 
permit would be issued to a farmer or group of farmers on the basis of the land to 
be farmed. First, a suitable set of equipment for tilling the soil and planting the 
area of crops to be grown would be provided. Second, a suitable size tractor for 
use with the tillage and planting equipment would be provided. The composition 
of a suitable set of equipment was defined as either tractor and one-way plow with 
seeder, or in raw crop areas , tractor, drill and trailer.
11® Final Report on a Farm Mechanization Study in Turkey by Harris P. Smith, Consultant on Farm 
Machinery. Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, NARA . Mission to Turkey, Records 
relating to TA Projects Box 2
117 Note from Fatin R. Zorlu, then Secretary General, International Economic Cooperation 
Organization o f Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry to Russell Dorr Chief of American Mission to 
Turkey, December 28,1951. RG 286 Records o f AID, Mission to Turkey, NARA. Subject Files, 1948- 
56 Box 5. Folder Agriculture Commodities.
11® Information Regarding Policies Taken to Improve Agricultural Credit Facilities. RG 286 
Records o f the AID Mission to Turkey, NARA. Subject Files, 1948-56. Folder: Agreements- 
Agricultural Equipment.
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The size of the tractor and the equipment matched with it would be 
determined by the farm equipment dealers. Farmers would not be issued a 
purchase permit for the purchase of any make of equipment unless spare parts 
and service facilities for that make were available at a distance not to exceed 150 
km. from the farm. Consistent with this policy, when farmers purchased 
equipment they would be required to make a minimum down payment of 20% 
from their own resources and would be extended credit by the Agricultural Bank 
for the balance.
The cultivation of new lands was categorized as an exceptional case. In this 
case if the farmer was unable to pay a 20% down payment, the Agricultural Bank 
would extend credit without any collateral. This procedure related to the 
cultivation of new land reflected another aspect of the agroeconomic 
development. One major effect of the introduction of the tractor was to permit a 
rapid increase in the amount of land plowed. With the new cheap power the 
tractor provided, tremendous areas of pasture and common grazing land were 
brought under cultivation.^^! Table No. 12 shows the increase in cultivated lands 
within the framework of this development project.
Year Cultivated Area 1000 Hectar Increase
1945 12.664 -
1946 13.093 3.4
1947 13.575 3.7
1948 13.900 2.4
1949 13.264 -4.6
1950 14.542 9.6
1951 15.272 5.0
1952 17.361 13.7
1953 18.812 8.4
SOURCE: Cultivated Area & Tractor #: DIE TIY 1968.S.165İ22
ü^ibid 
!20 ibid
Charles K. Mann, ‘Effects of Government Policy on Income Distribution : A Case Study of 
Wheat Production in Turkey Since WWII’, in Ergun Ozbudun & Aydın Ulusan, ed.. The Political 
Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey, N.Y., Holmes 8c Meier Publications, 1980, p.l98  
Kepenek, Gelişimi, Üretimi, Yapısıyla ve Sorunlarıyla Türkiye Ekonomisi, p .93.
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Reasons o f the Bad Im plem entation o f the Program. In the initial phase of 
the ECA program there were no sales organizations, no equipment to use in the 
training program either by dealers or government, and no repair shops in Turkey. 
Plans for delivery of fuel to rural areas were unsatisfactory. The facilities for 
assembling equipment were lacking. Credit was unavailable, funds were absent & 
the Agricultural Bank was inexperienced. ^^ 3 Nonetheless, Turkey experienced a 
rapid mechanization.
The understanding of the Turkish officials was another factor affecting the 
implementation of the program. The American officials pointed out the 
difference between spending money and wisely spending money since to spend 
money wisely to obtain the requisites for increased agricultural production was a 
difficult task that the Turkish officials could not handle easily. The essence of the 
problem was that there were huge sums invested in tractors, but lesser amounts in 
agricultural equipment .According  to the farm machinery program farmers 
needed to purchase a complete set of equipment; however, Turkish officials 
insisted that in the prevailing circumstances it was necessary for farmers to buy 
tractors and plows first. According to their reasoning if the farmers bought this 
equipment they would automatically buy the additional items to form a complete 
set as soon as they were needed.
Hugh K Richwine, Food and Agriculture Officer, ohyected to the use of 
partial and unadapted sets of equipment for efficient farming with an oversize
123 Note from Richwine, Food and Agriculture Division Officer o f the Aid Mission to Dr. D. A. 
Fitzgerald, Director o f Food and Agriculture Division, 23 November 1950. RG 286 Records o f the 
AID Mission to Turkey, NARA. Subject Files, 1948-53. Folder: Agricultural Commodities, 1951
Memo from H.K Richwine, Food and Agriculture Division Officer o f the Aid Mission to Russell 
Dorr, Chief o f American Mission in Turkey regarding Cereal Production & Equipment & Tractors 
for Turkey, June 11 1951. RG 286 Records o f the AID, Mission to Turkey, NARA. Subject Files, 
1948-53 Box 5, Folder: Agricultural Commodities, 1951.
125 Report o f Farm Equipment Program Conference, 17 July 1950. RG 286 Records of the AID 
Mission to Turkey, NARA. Subject Files, 1948-56. Folder: Agricultural Commodities, 1949-50..
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tractor. He warned that unless someone guided the mechanization program in 
Turkey farmers would insist on buying ‘Malboard’ tractor plows to replace ox- 
plows and tractors to replace oxen, yet continue sowing wheat by hand and negate 
any benefit from mechanization. Richwine concluded that in order for the 
program to succeeded the right types, kinds and sizes of equipment must be 
imported, and; training and servicing must be provided. 12®
The importation of inappropriate machines to Turkey especially the 
‘Malboard’ plows, wcis the basic reason for the ineffectual implementation of the 
program. Haris Smith, special advisor to the Ministry of Agriculture of Turkey, 
pointed out the inappropriateness of these Malboard plows, which did nothing 
more than push the soil to one side in a manner quite similar to that of an old 
wood plow. In other words, the type of plow that was sent to Turkey was not fitted 
to the Turkish soik^^?
The unsuitability of the credit extension procedure was another problem. 
In their very fragmented and small- sized holdings most of the Turkish rural 
population did not have a surplus that permitted capital formation, so the 
government had to develop public farm credit. The purpose of this credit 
extension was to enable farmers to expand ; or, to improve their operations in 
such ways that their productivity was increased ; their ability to repay improved; 
and their standard of living raised significantly,
126 Note from Hugh K. Richwine, Food and Agriculture Officer o f Aid Mission to W.R. Nolan, a 
High Rank Official from the Farm Machinery Branch, April 7, 1950. RG 286 Records o f the AID 
Mission to Turkey, NARA. Subject Files, 1948-56. Folder: Agricultural Commodities
127 Memo of Harris Smith, Special Adviser to the Turkish Ministry o f Agriculture to C.D. 
Robertson, Assistant Manager of International Harvester Co., June 5, 1950. RG 286 Records o f the 
AID Mission to Turkey, NARA. Subject Files, 1948-56. Folder: Agricultural Commodities
128 Confidential Report, No. 9 on Turkish Agriculture by Barker Mission to Turkey, 15 October 
1950. RG 286 RG 286 Records of the AID Mission to Turkey. Classified Subject Files, 1948-56. Box. 
12.
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The farmer had to have some “guarantees” or security to receive credit. The 
guarantee could be immovable, like various types of land or real estate; movable, 
like bonds, securities, jewelry and machinery; vouching for the buyer by several 
farmers, a practice which was called successive guarantees; or a guarantee of a 
businessman. 2^®
The farmer who bought Marshall Plan equipment had to pay 20% of the 
purchase price in cash. A loan could be secured for the balance of 80%. The 
outcome of this was that only large owners could obtain loans of a size sufficient to 
purchase a set of power farming equipment.
Table 13 shows the percentage of farmers who obtained more than TL 
10.000 credit and their ratio in total credits. As the table reveals, the credit 
extension service served only a minority of the total rural population in an 
increasing ratio. For extension of intermediate and long- term credits medium­
sized and large holdings were necessary. Villagers with farms of less than 100 
hectares seldom had enough money to purchase a complete tractor set which cost 
between $ 4550 to $ 9776.
^29Memo o f A Meeting about Agricultural Bank Credits to Farmers Buying EGA Equipment, 
March 2, 1950. RG 286 Records o f the AID Mission to Turkey, NARA . Subject Files, 1948-56. 
Folder: Agricultural Bank Credits
Confidential Report, No. 9 on Turkish Agriculture by Barker Mission to Turkey, 15 October 
1950. RG 286 Records o f the AID Mission to Turkey, NARA. Classified Subject Files, 1948-56. Box. 
12.
13’ Ibid.
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- _____ %___________ _________ 1.95.1___195.4___195.7__1960___ 19.63___1966___19B8_.
Ratio o f Farmers in 
The Total Farmer 
Eopulatioji:
TABLE NO. J 3 : £ARlVl£REDITJ^TIOS_OF.FARMERS RECEEffiD MORE THAN_TLJL0,00.0__&
__0.15__. . _Oj;5 .__0.46_ 0.43. „0.89___ 1.52.„._.2.42
Ratio o f These Credits 
In The Total Extended 
Credits_______________ JL29__1M 8_„.14.73___L6.90__ 25.83__ 28.M.__ 32.61І32
SQ.URCE:T.R AGRICULTURAL BANK’S GENERAL DIRECTORATE ACTIVIIY REPORTS OF
1950-68
Mechanized farming could not be practiced on small tracts of land. In the 
production of cereals, for example efficient application of mechanized 
agriculture on farms less than 400 hectares was questionable. Accordingly, 82% of 
the farms were not appropriate for mechanized agriculture (Table 14). The 
required size of land for mechanized agriculture and the estimated land 
distribution in Turkey proved to have deep repercussions with respect to the 
question of social readjustment.
TABLE NO 14: THE ESTIMATED SIZE OF THE TURKISH FARMS:
Size o f Number o f Acreage % o f Total
Earma:____________ Farms:............................. ................ ....... .............. „Acreage:
Over 1200 Acres 418 1.530.000 5
240 to 1200 Acre 5.764 4.140.000 13
Less than 240 Acres 2.000.000 25.770.000 82І^^
In the Turkish mechanization program the investment in tractors, trucks, 
farm machinery and fuel had been substantial and the profits accrued either to 
the government in the case of state farms or, to that very small segment of the 
population, the large landowners.^^“* State grain farming was started in 1942 as a 
means of increasing the supply of bread grains. Considerable areas of unoccupied 
level fertile land well- suited to mechanized farming were available for this
^^ 2 Ibid.; Koksal, ‘Türkiye’de Tarim.sal Kredi Sorunu’ in ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi, 499- 527.
EGA Country Study: Turkey, February 1949. RG 286 Records of AID, Mission to Turkey, NARA. 
Subject Files. Folder: Economic Conditions
Confidential Report, No. 9 on Turkish Agriculture by Barker Mission to Turkey, 15 October 
1950. RG 286 Records of the AID, Mission to Turkey, NARA. Classified Subject Files, 1948-56. Box. 
12. ^
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purpose. By 1950 there were 18 state farms with 500,000 acres under 
cultivation.i35These farms were useful in producing high quality seeds to raise the 
general level of production and in providing examples to private farmers of good 
farming methods with modern equipment,
An annual report described the far reaching effects of Turkish farm 
mechanization on the agricultural economy and rural structure. Farm machinery 
was being used to develop formerly uncultivated lands, to reduce land lying follow 
for more than one year and to cultivate land formerly worked by farm animals. 
According to this report, unless additional mechanized equipment was channeled 
to new land, a tendency towards concentration of land holdings in the hands of 
fewer farmers might develop and small farmers and tenants be displaced. Unless 
they could be absorbed on to new land, this would create landless peasants.* '^^ The 
cautious tone of the report continued by stating that uncontrolled importation 
and distribution of machinery in Turkey might be creating a class of landed 
gentry, and concluded that the mechanization process required a closer scrutiny 
by Turkish officials. To prevent the possible negative developments mentioned 
in the report, U.S. policy makers had some recommendations, including farm 
machinery cooperatives; new land development for landless farmers, and small­
sized machinery. These recommendations, however, could not be implemented in 
a sound manner, and what were defined as possibilities turned out to be realities 
for Turkey.
135 Member Report No. 9, Confidential. Barker Mission , 15 October 1950. Records o f the AID. 
Mission to Turkey, NARA. Classified Subject Files. Box 12 Folder: Barker Reports.
13® EGA Country Study: Turkey, February 1949. RG 286 Records of AID, Mission to Turkey, NARA. 
Subject Files. Folder: Economic Conditions
137 RG 286. Records o f the AID, Mission to Turkey, NARA. Classified Subject Files Public Reports: 
Agriculture. Box 11 Folder: Agricultural Reports.
138 ibid
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JUEEERCUSSIQNS_QE
IHKmGHWAYJMER03$MENTandJE'ABM.ME.CHANIZAI10.NJER0jGRAMS:
In the midst of a ruined world Turkish officials tried to achieve something 
for the benefit of the country with the help of U.S. foreign aid. Neither the 
“Karayolcu generation” nor the inexperienced officials of a young republic 
lacking in nearly every required incentive of a liberal economy could have 
predicted the repercussions of the attempted improvements. But in 1997 to 
discuss and analyze what was experienced and what these experiences brought to 
the society is possible.
During the implementation of the improvement program, there was a steep 
and steady increase in the number of the motor vehicles. By 1950 the mobility of 
automobiles, trucks and buses was not wholly restricted to the acljacent areas of 
the towns. “While some parts of the country were not yet efficiently served and 
some key highway links were not yet opened, Turkey in the four years , 1947-1951, 
moved rapidly towards a connected national road system”. 1
TABLE NO. 15: NtJMBKR OF MOTOR VEHICLES IN TURKEY. 1946- 52
Yeiir Totül Regristration Pa.ssenjrer Cars T rucks Buses:
1946 15.000 4.600 10.100 300
1949 20.881 7.783 11.368 1.730
1950 26.985 10.475 13.375 3.135
1951 36.349 15.642 16.802 3.905
1952 42.876 18.867 19.870 4.1392
Turkish citizens began to feel the impact of highway improvement on the 
cost of transportation by the 1950’s. In 1951 it was reported that after only 4 
months of machine maintenance on the İğdır -Kağızman junction, trucker’s rates
 ^ Lehman, ‘ Building Roads and A Highway Administration in Turkey’, in Teaf, Jr. and Franck, ed.. 
Hands Across Frontiers: Case Studies in Technical Cooperation, p. 403-4.
2 ibid., p. 397
dropped from 5 kuruş per kilo to 1-1/2 kuruş per kilo.^ Freight prices for all of 
Turkey were reduced an average of 60% as compared to 1947 and 1948.4 
Turkey the cost of transporting goods by animal- drawn cart was about estimated 
as $ .95 to $ 1.00 per ton mile. Average over-all cost of road transport, estimated as 
$ .13 per ton mile in 1947, dropped to no more than $.06 per ton mile by 1950 
(Table 15). Another document, dated March 16, 1953 indicated that the roads 
program had reduced transportation costs in the Turkish interior from nearly $ 
1.00 to $ 0.07 per ton mile.^ Highway improvement also led to a decline in the cost 
of passenger transportation (table 16).
IABULJSÜ 13;Xi3MEARISONjOFjmiLCKING RATES PER METRIC TON ON A NUMBER ÛE 
MAJÛBJ8DJJIES,T949J îl52:
Route Distance (Mile)
TL
1949
Ton
1952 MAY
Ankara- Erzurum 803 500 180
Istanbul- Antakya 773 150 102
Istanbul-İçel 635 150 68
Ankara- Elazığ 540 180 80
Ankara- Samsun 345 150 48
Ankara-Içel 328 100 48
Istanbul-Ankara 307 120 32
Ankara- Konya 163 100 20^
IABLE_NQ_lfiX:OMEARIS_QNXE.THEJBUS_ERICES FROM ANKARA XQmHER_CITIES,.BY  
L949_&T951:
EERJEASSENGER.CTL)
FrorcLAnkara^To ___1349 ____1951_______ _Decliııe^ofLCo.sLP-er
Istanbul 15 10 33
Kayseri 8.5 6 30
Zonguldak 15 9 40
Samsun 16 11 31
Konya 10 5 50’
^Annual Highway Report of Turkey, 30 July 1951.
4 Impact of Highway Operations on Turkish Economy by EGA Feature Service, RG 286, Records of the 
AID Mission to Turkey, NARA.. Press Comments Relating to TA Projects Box 1 Folder: TA 77-47- 
Highway Engineers.
5 Secret Security Information about Turkey, March 16, 1953. RG 59, General Records of the Department 
of State, Miscellaneous Lot Files. Lot File, No 58 D 610, NARA, Box 3.
 ^ Lehman, ‘ Building Roads and A Highway Administration in Turkey’, in Teaf, Jr. and Franck, ed.. 
Hands Across Frontiers: Case Studies in Technical Cooperation, p.404, cited from memo A.W. 
Williamson, Division Engineer to H.E. Hilts, June 1952.
 ^ TUtengil, Y9timaive YktisadiBakymdanTilrkiye’nin Karayollary, p.76
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The developed transport network allowed for mass production of products 
resulting in a decline in prices. In 1946 Edward Lawson, American Embassy 
Counselor for economic affairs, declared prices for Turkish goods “ were so high 
that this made them non- competitive in normal international trade”. Recognition 
of this led the Turkish government to make various efforts to bring its export 
prices more inline with the world markets.^
Along with the decline in prices another direct effect of this improvement 
was saving of time. In 1907, transportation by animal-driven cart had been so slow 
that it made the exchange of commodities impossible ( Table 17). With the new 
Ankara- Konya Highway, for example, a vast new area was brought into rapid 
communication with both of these major market and distribution centers, cutting 
the time of transporting goods between the two cities from 24- 36 hours by train to 
about 6 hours by truck®. (Table 18). This served to a great extent in preventing the 
waste of products, especially perishables. 
lABLEJ
İstanbul- Edirne 
İstanbul- Ankara 
İzmir- Afyon 
Ankara- Bursa 
Ankara-Samsun 
Diyarbakır- İskenderun
I RO.U.TES_(_HD.URSL;
In 1907 Animal Driven Carts In 1957 by Autos
47
79
66
67
96
102
3.30
7.30
9.15
6.15 
7.00
8.30
 ^ Turkey’s Need for A Capacity to Service Further Foreign Loans, Secret Report by Edward Lawson, 
American Embassy Economic Affairs Counselor, December 23, 1946. RG 286, Records of the AID 
Mission to Turkey, NARA. Classified Subject Files, Administrative Agreements, Box 1 Folder: Loan
® Confidential Member Report No. 9. Barker Mission , 15 October 1950. RG 286, Records of the AID 
Mission to Turkey, NARA. Classified Subject Files, Box 12. Folder: Barker Reports.
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TABLE NO 18JD_URAILQJvi,Or_BUS_TRAVEL BYJ949 AND laST iH aU R S):
Cities 1949 1951:
Ankara-Istanbul 18 14
Ankara- Kayseri 11 9
Ankara-Zonguldak 14 9
Ankara-Samsun 20 16
Ankara- Konya 9 5^ ®
The importation of great amounts of tractors and related parts was justified 
on the basis that they were the prerequisites to increasing Turkey’s total food 
production. A shortage of draft animals in Turkey contributed to low yields in 
agriculture production. Due to this shortage the average farmer could not plow 
his harvest on time, or, plow his fields as often as he should. Farm machinery was 
considered a means to overcome these handicaps. 12
Tractor owners , most of whom were large landowners, were able to 
increase their output by a significant proportion,!^ resulting in a surplus in 
production. This fact made agriculture a sector that enabled capital formation. 
Thus, agriculture was commercialized. The mechanization program transformed 
Turkish agriculture into a capitalist enterprise, where instead of production for 
local consumption, machinery- operating farmers began to sell a larger proportion 
of what they produced in the cash economy.14
This led to an increase in the income of these large land owners. By the 
1960s, incomes varied according to the property size. In properties under 50 
decares income per person was TL 485; it rose to TL 1,117 for those with up to
m Tiitengil, Yçtimaive YktisadBakymdanTürkiye’nin Karayolları, p. 98-9
* *  Memo from ECA Administration to American Embassy in Ankara, 4 April 1950. RG 286, Records of 
the AID Mission to Turkey, NARA. Classified Subject Files, Folder: Procurement Authorizations
l^Hirsch, Poverty and Plenty of the Turkish Farm: A study of Income Distribution in Turkish Agriculture, 
p. 172
13 Ibid.
14 Berberoglu, ‘Postwar Reintegration of Turkey into the World Economy,1950- 60’ in Journal of Asian 
and African Studies, p. 261; Miibeccel Kyray & Jan Hinderink, ‘Interdependences Between Agroeconomic 
Development and Social Change: A Comparative Study Conducted In the Çukurova Region of Southern 
Turkey’ in The Journal of Development Studies, p. 501.
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200 decares; with more than 200 decares income rose to TL 7, 417; and those 
with possession of more than 1000 decares had an income of TL 49,750 per 
person.15
As surplus in agricultural production is the prerequisite of 
commercialization of agriculture, improved roads were the precondition of this 
prerequisite since improved roads increased interactions between isolated 
settlements. The farmers, in touch with each other, were able to identify 
commodities in demand by the market. Thus, they began to grow those products 
for which they could obtain cash. This kind of specialization was true especially 
in regions where industrial cash crops were grown.^^Specialized farming 
generally meant the production of an export commodity since this provided 
foreign exchange.
This transformation completely upset the existing social structure of rural 
Turkey and increased the country’s social differentiation. Farm machinery owners 
knew that more land for cultivation meant higher levels of production, and 
therefore attempted to buy or lease more land at the expense of weaker peasants. 
This led to the concentration of land holdings. Especially in east, south and 
west Anatolia, large or even very large land owners were in possession of 
approximately 25% of the cultivable land. About 25 % to 30% of these large 
holdings belonged to the state and were operated as seed-increasing, or animal
Mübeccel Belik Kyray, Türkiye’de Köy ve Köylü Sorununa KalkynmaPlanlarynynYaklaİjymy’ in 
ODTÜ Gelijîme Dergisi, 1970-72 Güz, Vol. 1.
Aktan, ‘Mechanization of Agriculture in Turkey’ in Land Economics, p. 282
'^Theodor, Bergmann, Mechanization and Agricultural Development: First General Report,
Guttingen,Herodot,1984,p. 84; John W. Mellor, The Economics of Development, Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell 
University Press, 1966, p.l03
'^Bergmann, Mechanization and Agricultural Development: First General Report, p. 86.; Bahattin Aksit, ‘ 
Kysal DönüJjüm and Köy Araft^alary 1960-80’ , in Türkiye’de Tar^nsal Yapjlar, 1923-2000 compiled 
by Şevket Pamuk and Zafer Toprak, Ankara, Yurt Yayynlary, 1988, p. 192.
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stock-breeding farms under the Ministry of Agriculture.l^Among the remaining 
70% very few owners operated their land as large farms. Instead they divided it 
into small tracts and rented out to sharecroppers, or to cash tenants.
Utilization of primitive methods of production due to minimal capital 
investment; insecurity of the tenure; and disinterest of both the landowner and 
share cropper in improvement made sharecropping a disadvantageous system for 
the small land owners and landless peasants.^® On the other hand, 
sharecropping, appealed to the large land owners, since they had a strong 
bargaining position and they could hire the cheapest labor. Thus, most large 
landowners preferred this system to cash tenancy or self operation, even when 
they had the opportunity for mechanized farming.
Another practice that fostered social differentiation was “ the payments in 
kind , which provided assurance for the landlords in case of price fluctuations in 
farm products. Under the relative primitive technological as well as socio­
economic conditions this system of land operation maximized returns to the 
ovmers of large lands.” this system, most large land owner turned into
rentiers who did not live on their estates. Instead they hired third parties to 
manage the land. In these cases of absentee ownership the income from land 
was spent in the cities rather then on improvement or maintanance of the soil, 
which led to a deterioration of the lands.22
Mechanized farming had a negative impact on sharecropping. It was 
possible for one tractor and its equipment to displace ten village farmers, together 
with their animals and most of their wooden implements. The mechanized
Resat Aktan, ’Problems of Land Reform in Turkey’ , Report prepared for International Conference on 
Agricultural Aspect of Economic Development held at Istanbul, 2- 15 August 1964.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 ibid
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operators demanded only a few weeks’ work per year available as casual wage 
labor connected with unmechanized farm operations.23 Mechanized operators 
also displaced sharecroppers by renting tracts of lands, that had formerly been 
leased to the share croppers, in order to enlarge their operations.^^ This 
transformed the sharecroppers into agricultural wage workers for non-mechanized 
farming activities,’ with a small share of production and greater difficulty in 
maintain their living even on a subsistence level.’25
Rural Turkey could roughly be broken down into three groups on the basis 
of land ownership patterns, with large landowners at the top, small land owners in 
the middle, and landless laborers at the bottom.26 However there was no clear 
division between the small land owners and landless peasants since possession of 
small tracts of land did not make much sense, and were generally lost due to 
heavy debt.27 Moreover, the decreasing need for man power led to the cheapening 
of rural labor and rural unemployment.28
Social differentiation did not occur merely in terms of the deepening gap 
between large and small landowners and landless peasant. The process of 
agricultural mechanization also led to the strengthening of of small 
entrepreneurs between the large and small land owners and landless, 
unemployed peasants.
23 Kiray & Hinderink, ‘Interdependences Between Agroeconomic Development and Social Change: A 
Comparative Study Conducted In the Çukurova Region of Southern Turkey’ in The Journal of 
Development Studies, p. 501-2.
24 Aktan, ‘Mechanization of Agriculture in Turkey’ in Land Economics, p. 281;
23ed. Miibeccel Kyay, Social Stratification and Development in the Mediterranean Basin, Institute of 
Social Studies, the Hague, 1973, p.l4
26 Timur Kuran, ‘Internal Migration the Urorganized Urban Sector and Income Distribution in Turkey, 
1963-78’, Ergun Özbudun & Ayd;  ^Ulusan, ed.. The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey, 
N.Y: Holmes & Meier Publish,, 1955, p. 350
2^Kyray, ed. Social Stratification and Development in the Mediterranean Basin, p.l4
28 Memo from A.W. Williamson, Division Engineer to Russell Dorr, Chief of American Mission in 
Turkey, 13 December 1951. RG 286, Records of the AID Mission to Turkey ,NARA. Classified Subject 
Files, Folder: Roads 1949-51.
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Consistent with the ERP aim of integrating Turkey into a system whose basis 
was private enterprise and competition, “aid extended to Turkish agriculture had 
been allocated to private industry for the importation of equipment supplies. This 
contributed to the development of private business in Turkey” . 29 Easy credit 
terms and investment privileges stimulated the rise of a new group of 
entrepreneurs, who soon achieved an economic status based on their own 
competitive ability, productivity and ingenuity.
These dealers played an important role in the Turkish agricultural 
program. In accordance with instructions from the planning bureau they set up 
and operated spare parts warehouses; established servicing and repair centers; and 
trained mechanics and repair men. In addition, they organized cooperatives 
connected with private enterprise in order to carry out mechanized agriculture.^^
These dealers were also responsible for making Turkey a graveyard for 
farm machinery. Hugh Richwine, Food and Agriculture Division officer was 
impressed with the dealers as businessmen who were primarily interested in profit, 
but not with the equipment they sold. He stated that ”in fact some of the dealers 
did not know from an elephant in so far as equipment was concemed”.^ 2 Russell 
Dorr, Chief of the American Mission to Turkey, stated that these Turkish farm 
equipment dealers needed better training for servicing machines and instructing
29 Kemal Karpat, ’Recent Developments in Turkey and Their Social Background’ International Affairs, 
Vol 38, No.3, July 1962, p. 311; RG 286, Records of the AID Mission to Turkey ,NARA. Classified 
Subject Files Public Reports: Agriculture, Box 11, Folder: Agricultural Reports.
^9 Karpat,’ Recent Political Developments in Turkey and Their Social Background’ International Affairs, 
p.311.
Information Letter from Hugh K .Richwine, Food and Agricultural Officer in Aid Mission to W.R. 
Nolan, Farm Machinery Branch, 7 April 1950. RG 286, Records of the AID Mission to Turkey ,NARA. 
Subject Files, 1948-53, Box 6, Folder: Commodities-Agricultural, 1949-50; Ak{)it, Ky’sal DönüJjüm and 
Köy Arajlymalary 1960-80’ , in Türkiye’de Tarjmsal Yapjilar, 1923-2000 compiled by Pamuk and Toprak, 
p. 134
^2 Memo of Hugh Richwine, Food and Agriculture Division officer in Aid Mission, regarding to the 
Equipment Dealers, 6 March 1951. RG 286, Records o f the AID Mission to Turkey, NARA. Subject Files, 
1948-53, Box 4, Folder: Agriculture-1951.
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about their care and use. The distributors’ failure in initial servicing and 
instruction of farmers resulted in the inefficient use and shorter life of equipment. 
U.S. planners feared that this ignorance could jeopardize the future of Turkish 
agricultural development.
Dealers also demanded extremely high prices for spare parts, as a rule 
charging customers a price based on the exchange rate ranging from 10:1 to 
20:1.34 Moreover, the majority of the dealers were reluctant to import spare parts 
at all, in preferring the quicker profits to be made by importing new vehicles. 35
The dealers also extended farmers short- term credit with excessive interest 
rates.36 There were rumors of widespread graft in the Adana region, the 
accurateness of which meant that the dealers took advantage “through the 
outrageous interest rates charged to small cotton farmers who were unable to 
secure sufficient credit from the Agricultural Bank”.37 In the absence of the 
required credit facilities the vacuum was not filled only by the dealers. Landlords, 
local merchants and money lenders also extended credits to the small farms.33 
These moneylenders were comprised of tax collectors, school teachers, physicians, 
pharmacists and other local officials. 39
It was common in Southeast Anatolia for the small land owners to borrow 
money by turning over the ownership of their land at a value equivalent to the
33 Memo from Russell Dorr, Chief of Mission to ECA Administration, Confidential, 13 June 1950. RG 
469 Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, NARA. Geographic Files, Folder: Commodity- 
Farm Equipment.
34 Ibid.
35 RG 286, Records of the AID Mission to Turkey, NARA. Subject Files Box 8, Folder: Commodities.
35 ibid
3^Memo of Hugh Richwine, Food and Agriculture Division officer in Aid Mission, Regarding to the 
Equipment Dealers, 6 March 1951. RG 286, Records of the AID Mission to Turkey, NARA. Subject Files, 
1948-53, Box 4, Folder: Agriculture-1951.
33Member Report No. 9 on Turkish Agriculture, Confidential. Barker Mission to Turkey, 15 October 
1950. RG 286, Records of the AID Mission to Turkey, NARA. Classified Subject Files, Box 12.
39 Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 93, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture cooperative with AID, February 1972.
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loan. The moneylender, received the entire earnings of the land until the total 
repayment of the d eb t, and as a result, the original owner was likely to be reduced 
to the status of a share cropper^^.
Thus these intermediaries were an important factor in the social 
disengagement of rural Turkey. With the passage of time it was understood that 
“ this practice, along with other things like subsidy prices for crops, cheap 
machinery and abolition of tcixes on agriculture to the new landowning groups 
,caused a minority to be enriched at the expense of the nation as a whole”“^!
It was an unavoidable outcome that the introduction of machines displaced 
labor from the land. Since the chief purpose of machinery was the reduction of 
labor, it might be argued that, in the long run the machine would enable the 
displaced farmer to become employed in more productive sectors of the economy 
than subsistence agriculture^  ^ but in the short run this led to unemployment.
In Turkey there was a surplus labor force. This surplus was not apparent 
due to the practice of traditional subsistence agriculture whose primitive methods 
of cultivation required a rather extensive labor force to produce agricultural 
crops.4^ The introduction of machinery to rural Turkey forced many villagers 
either to abandon farming, or become seasonal workers.
Tractor owners needed human labor for the extensive plowing to be done 
during both fall and spring harvests which each lasted about one to one month to 
forty-five days. The villagers , when necessary with their families, worked during
Member Report No. 9 on Turkish Agriculture, Confidential. Barker Mission to Turkey, 15 October 
1950. RG 286, Records of the AID Mission to Turkey, NARA. Classified Subject Files, Box 12.
^^Karpat,’ Recent Political Developments in Turkey and Their Social Background’ , July 1962.
Richard Robinson, ‘Turkey’s Agrarian Revolution and the Problem of Urbanization’ in Public Opinion 
Quarterly , Vol. 22,1958-59, No. 3,p. 397.
Hershlag, Turkey: An Economy in Transition , p. 159.
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those seasons, but for the remainder of the year had nearly nothing to do.^“* It is 
possible to conclude that mechanization of farming was the main reason for 
underemployment in Turkey.
Seasonal, temporary employment could not produce an alternative for a 
free rural labor force. Rural unemployment was especially severe in the southern 
and southeastern area, from Çukurova east, where whole villages were sometimes 
displaced by advancing farm mechanization, as a few men with tractors took over 
the work formerly carried out by a dozen or even a score of families and their draft 
animals."^^ The displaced peasant was forced to migrate to urban settlements to 
find work.
However, there was an inadequate investment in Turkish industry to take 
up the slack.46 This movement to the cities resulted in urban underemployment 
and unemployment. Turkey failed to establish adequate levels in its non- 
agricultural sectors that could correlate to the rapid mechanization in agriculture . 
On the contrary, there was only slight and gradual improvement in industrial 
development. Even the initiation of larger industrial schemes did not result in 
immediate industrial growth. Therefore, unemployment became a dominant 
characteristic of Turkish urban setdements.
Though there had been a steady increase in the number of industrial jobs 
this upsurge was unable to absorb the large migrant population of disposed 
peasant families. As early as 1951 it was estimated that there were over a million
Hirsch, Poverty and Plenty of the Turkish Farm: A study of Income Distribution in Turkish Agriculture, 
p.5
Current Problems and Future Developments’ Survey by the Mission, May 2, 1952. RG 286, Records of 
AID, NARA. Classified Subject Files, Box 12. Folder: Dorr Survey.
Robinson, ‘Turkey’s Agrarian Revolution and the Problem of Urbanization’ in Public Opinion 
Quarterly, p. 399.
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unemployed in the towns as a consequence of this migration. This represented 
over 8% of the total labor force and over 50% of the labor force in urban areas.
The insufficiency of the non- agricultural sectors also resulted in substantial 
underemployment in urban Turkey. The expanding service sectors provided work 
to a large number of migrants as street hawkers, porters, bootblacks, water sellers, 
parking lot attendants and other marginal occupations characterized by 
intermittent employment and low productivity.^^
The factors which restricted the practice of subsistence agriculture directly 
effected incomes and production. This resulted in irregularity and instability and 
played a m ^or role in the diversion of the population from the countryside to 
urban settlements. Economic hardship was the key factor in the shift of population 
from rural areas. 49
Internal migration however was not the sole reason for urbanization in 
Turkey. In addition to internal migration there was a population increase of 2.8% 
per annum between 1950 and 1960 However internal migration accounted for 
60% of the rise in urban population. Moreover internal migration was not 
introduced to Turkish society by the farm mechanization process, o r / and the 
improvement of the transport systems. However these two programs became main 
determinants in accelerating this tendency (Table 19& 20).
^^Berberoglu, ‘Postwar Reintegration of Turkey into the World Economy, 1950- 60’ in Journal of Asian 
and African Studies, p. 261.
48 Michael N. Danielson & Rusen Keles, Politics of Rapid Urbanization: Government and Growth in 
Modem Turkey, Holmes & Meier, N.Y., 1985, p. 38-9
49 Erol Tiimertekin, Internal Migration in Turkey , Ytanbul: Ytanbul Üniversitesi Yayyilary TaJj
Matbaasi, 1968, p. 6.
Nur Vergin, ‘Hyzl>I>ehirle|3menin Sosyolojik ve Siyasal Sonuclary’ inHyzl^ehirlejjmenin Sosyolojik ve 
Siyasal Sonuçlary, ed. SISAV , 1986, p. 28.
RuJjen KeleJ), ‘ Kentlejjmeve Kamu Yönetimi Sorunlary’ inHyzlyi>ehirlel)menin Sosyolojik ve Siyasal 
Sonuçlary, ed. SISAV , 1986, p.l33;Mimarlar Odasy Ankaral>ubesi, Türkiye’de Kentlejjme, Ankara,Ocak 
1971, p. 54
91
._RATE_OF_P.OEULATIQN_CHANGE:
PTRIOD ....... . _T_0_TAL_._. ________  URBAN . _..............  _ RURAL:
1927-40 2.1 2.8 1.9
1940-50 1.6 1.8 1.6
1950-60 2.9 6.4 1.9
TABLEJi_O_20: EFFECT O F  TNTF.RNAI. MIGRATION ON P.OPULATLON DISTRIB.UIION. IN
IIIRKEY_(_%)
YEARS RATIO OF IJRRAN POP %_RURAL.PQP..... „  RATIO INTERNAL MIGRAIION
1927 16.4 83.6 -
1935 16.6 83.4 6.8
1940 18.0 82.0 -
1945 18.3 81.7 -
1950 18.5 81.5 8.3
1955 22.1 77.9 10.4
1960 25.4 74.9 11.0
Source; Erol Tumertekin, Internal Migration in Turkey, p. 38
Causes of migration can be defined in terms of a” push- pull effect.” Both 
open and disguised unemployment in the villages and in agriculture “pushed” the 
increasing population and unemployed labor force to the cities. The city “pulled” 
new comers with real and often imaginary job opportunities, and to a lesser 
degree, social and cultural facilities. 2^
The migrants expected the opportunity for vertical mobility. The m^ority 
of migrants believed that the city offered their children the best opportunity for 
advancement and that their children could reach the highest positions available if 
they had the ability to do so.^^
Improved roads greatly increased the mobility of rural dwellers, and paved 
the way for those who decided to start a new life in the booming urban centers. 
These roads, along with expansion of bus services, reduced the isolation of 
Turkey’s villages. Rural dwellers could make more frequent visits to urban centers 
and observe the differences in life styles in the country and in the city. In general 
villagers seem eager to go into the city whenever they have time , or pretext to do
z.Y. Hershlag, ‘Development versus Growth’ in the Philosophy of Development Revisited, Leiden, 
1984.
Ergun Ozbudun & Aydin Ulusan, ‘Overview’in. Ergun Ozbudun & Aydin Ulusan, ed.. The Political 
Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey, p. 17
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so. 54 Table 21 shows the dramatic increase in rail and highway passenger traffic, 
especially the latter.
IABLEJ!j.Q.2h-RAILAND HIGHWAYJTRAVEL IN_TURKEY^.1948.&J,955:
1948 1955
Passenger-kms by rails 
Passenger-kms by road:
2. 545.800 
1.211.070
3.917.300
8.090.00055
In their move to the cities rural migrants were mostly disappointed, due to 
the overwhelming problems in urban Turkey. In Turkish cities population growth 
consistently outpaced industrial expansion, resulting in widespread 
unemployment. Large number of migrants had temporary jobs and low 
incomes.55 After the 1950s Turkey began to experience a new phenomena , 
overurbanization.
Overurbanization was a direct outcome of the failure of the developing 
countries to create adequate employment in nonfarming sectors of the economy. 
The cities could not provide sufficient employment opportunities to accomodate 
the rapid rate of internal migration resulting in increasing unemployment and 
underemployment in urban centers and construction of squatter houses, the 
gecekondus.57
Turkish urbanization has been in the form of more and more expansion 
and growth of the big cities.58 The statistics on Turkish urbanization confirms the 
seriousness of overurbanization. In the thirteen years between 1927 and 1950,
^^Danielson & Keles, Politics of Rapid Urbanization: Government and Growth in Modem Turkey, p.34; 
Karpat, ‘Social Effects of Farm Mechanization in Turkish Villages’ in Social Research, p.88-89
55Robinson, ‘Turkey’s Agrarian Revolution and the Problem of Urbanization’ in Public Opinion 
Quarterly, p.400
55 Danielson & Kelej), Politics of Rapid Urbanization: Government and Growth in Modem Turkey, p. 218
57 Ilhan Tekeli & Leila Erder, Yerlejme Yapjfeyiyi Uyum Süreci Olarak ^  Göçler, Ankara: H.U. Yayyilary 
Çag Matbaasy, 1978, p. 333
58RuİJenKele|3, ‘ Kentlejimeve Kamu Yönetimi Sorunlary’ inHyzljbehirlelimenin Sosyolojik ve Siyasal 
Sonuclari, ed. SISAV , 1986, p.l33
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population of cities increased only 1% - from 24.2% to 25.2% of the total 
population; however, from 1950 and 1955, the figure rose to 28.5% ; a 3.3.% 
increase in only five years. This represented the movement of about 800.000 
individuals.
Inadequate housing has been an outstanding problem of the Turkish 
urbanization process. Private investment concentrated too much in the 
construction of private dwellings and although the war and the trend of rapid 
urbanization had aggravated the situatition, the Turkish government had a 
hesitation to interfere.®^
The inadequate investment in housing led to a mushrooming of 
gecekondus.^l A comparative approach revealed that regular housing has been 
less available than the jobs for the newcomers. Facing the expensive cost of private 
houses and government’s unwillingness to make enormous investments, the 
migrants began to construct, the gecekondus, literally meant housing built 
overnight, by illegally occupying the land.®2
IABLE_NQ^l: S.QUATIER-HDUSING (1945.8a)J?
Year_. #of Units___ HousingJStock . ^ ofJnd. . %. of
1945 10.000 4.0 40.000 1.4
1950 100.000 4.8 500.000 12.8
1955 170.000 6.5 850.000 13.5
1960 240.000 16.7 1.200.000 16.4
SOURCE: KENT-KOOP, KONUT 81, ANKARA, 1982, P. 23p3
^^Robinson, ‘Turkey’s Agrarian Revolution and the Problem of Urbanization’ in Public Opinion 
Quarterly, p. 399-400
Turkish Government’s Views of Its own Problems, an attachment of the Judd Polk’s, U.S. Treasury 
Representative in the Middle East, Financial Report, August 8, 1949, Confidential. RG 84, Foreign Service 
Posts of the Department of State, Turkey, NARA. Ankara Embassy, Confidential File, 1949, Box 49.
^^Robinson, ‘Turkey’s Agrarian Revolution and the Problem of Urbanization’ in Public Opinion 
Quarterly , p. 399. In the Bill for the Improvement, Elimination and Prevention of Squatter Housing , 
Article 2, gecekondu is defined as’ ...buildings constructed on land belonging to others without the 
consent of the owner and without regard to either the legislation dealing with housing and construction or 
the general regulations...’ citation from Turhan Yurukkan’s Urbanization, Squatter Houses and Housing 
Policy, Ankara, Dogus, 1966.
Danielson & Keles, Politics of Rapid Urbanization: Government and Growth in Modem Turkey, p. 41 
Ibid., p. 42
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This gecekondu construction resulted in heterogenization of the cities 
along the lines of ‘hemşehrilik’( village of origin), occupation, income, lifestyle, 
religious commitments, class and political party affiliation.®^ This heterogenity 
reveals just how far the Turkish cities were from urbanism, a distinct style of life 
behavior pattern , attitudes and values of urban residents which are reflected in 
the urban way of life.®®
Heterogenization was the indirect confirmation of the dual society and dual 
economy in Turkey. This dual society has been defined as the direct outcome of 
mass migration and unemployment associated with urbanization. E.F. Schumacher 
, in his Small is Beautiful described dual economy as,
“One of the unhealthy and disruptive tendencies in virtually 
all the developing countries is the emergence of the Dual 
Economy, in which there were two different worlds. It is not 
a matter of some people being rich and others being poor; 
but, it is a matter of two ways of life existing sided by side.”
66
In Turkey “inability of the industrialized sector to keep pace with the flood 
of migrants created a second economy often called informal , or traditional 
sector, often characterized by small scale service enterprises, labor- intensive 
employment’ ’.®^
This ‘informal’ urban economy with its ability to absorb large amounts of 
surplus labor displays a lack of organization. There is no standardization among
Bahattin Aksit, ‘Studies in Rural Transformation in Turkey, 1950- 1990’s in Paul Stirling, ed.,Culture 
and Economy: Changes in Turkish Village, Eathen Press, 1993.
K.S. Srikantan, ‘Regional and Rural- Urban Socio- Demographic Differences in Turkey’ in Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 27, Summer 1973.
®® Ernest F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful, N.Y: Herper & Row Publishers, 1989, p. 75
Danielson & Keles, Politics of Rapid Urbanization: Government and Growth in Modem Turkey, p . 40
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jobs due to the absence of mechanism , like licensing or credential
requirements.^^.
Duality is the most obvious feature of Turkish urban centers. Low 
consumption- high consumption; luxurious dwellings- gecekondu are the 
indicators of this dual structure.^^
^^Kuran, ‘Internal Migration the Urorganized Urban Sector and Income Distribution in Turkey, 1963-78’, 
Ozbudun & Ulusan, ed.. The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey, p. 350-1
Mimarlar Odasi Ankara Şubesi, Türkiye’de Kentleşme, p. 56.
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CONCLUSION:
When Turkish political elite prepared the Turkish postwar development 
programs, they envisioned a postwar world order where Turkish neutrality would 
endure. Later, however, after evaluating the current developments in the world 
conjuncture such as the rapid dissolution of the Grand Alliance of WWII; the 
accelerated momentum towards a bipolar world order; and the aggressive attitude 
of the U.S.S.R. towards Turkey, in the form of verbal attacks and territorial 
demands, these Turkish policy makers realized the invalidity of their assumptions. 
They realized that Turkey’s place among the free world countries was compulsory.
In the postwar period the Western Europe, under the leadership of the 
U.S., prepared the European Recovery Program, the crucial link in a tripartite 
“free” world recovery program. This joint effort would erase or minimize the 
lasting repercussions of WWII, which had disturbed the ongoing social, political 
and economic systems of the Western European countries. This had lead to a 
cessation in production, the duration of which could not be predicted.
When the ERP was launched, the goal of the U.S. administration was to 
enable nations, through individual and concentrated efforts, to become 
independent of extraordinary external economic assistance by 1952. The most 
important means of attaining this goal was through the economic viability in the 
participating countries. Therefore, when U.S. planners evaluated the individual 
country programs, they encouraged those that could to boost productivity since 
high levels of productivity would breed the simultaneous developments of low
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prices and a rise in living standards. This was expected to the stage for recovery 
and for a fully multilateral system of world trade.
Turkey’s inclusion among the “free” world countries brought new 
responsibilities. In the framework of ERP, the primary ohyective for Turkey was the 
expansion of the Turkish economy through increased agricultural production and 
the integration of this expanding economy with that of Western Europe. 
According to the envisioned integration, Turkey’s agricultural products would be 
exported primarily to other participating countries, reducing those countries 
dependency on dollar sources for such commodities. Additional earnings 
generated from those exports would enable Turkey to import the necessary items 
for the construction and development of industry.
Strong determination; an undemagogic, realistic approach ; and wise 
planning would be the prerequisites for the attainment of these olyectives. An 
accurate diagnosis of the current situation in Turkey, and the most appropriate 
selection among possible development projects would determine the future 
success or failure of the country’s endeavors. Shaped with these considerations 
highway improvement and farm mechanization programs were chosen as the 
most efficient means to achieve the goals set by the ERP.
By 1947, Turkey had approximately 43,000 km of highways, an 
insufficient length to meet the country’s needs. Turkey’s topographic 
characteristics; lack of technological knowledge, lack of capital , an 
administrative body , and skilled staff for the construction of an efficient highway 
system ; and, above all, the transportation policy could explain this insufficiency.
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Turkish policy makers and U.S. planners had reached a consensus on the 
development of highways, of whose inadequacy had repercussions in every field of 
life , including waste of products; high costs; restriction of the dissemination of 
information; and physical isolation of settlements. These resulted in an extremely 
fragmented internal market. Thus commenced the “revolutionary” highway 
improvement program, a $ 5,000, 000 allocation from the Turkish Aid Program, to 
begin mechanized construction of a national transportation network.
Although inadequate transportation was an important factor for low 
productivity and marketing of agricultural products, it was not the sole reason. 
Policy makers believed that Turkey’s low agricultural productivity was due to the 
practice of traditional subsistence agriculture, since in this practice , production is 
primitive, labor- intensive and highly affected by weather conditions. Through 
mechanization Turkey could realize high productivity, which would mean 
agricultural surplus for exports.
These crucial “ mechanization” programs caused a deep- rooted social 
transformation in Turkey. Evaluation of the success or failure of these programs 
must take into consideration their responsiveness to the immediate problem, 
improving the material ravages of war, the enduring problems, those involving 
the reorganization of the world economy to maximum output of goods and 
service. It must also consider the repercussions on the social fabric of Turkey.
In response to the immediate problems, Turkey was able to supply grain to 
the Western European countries, which were suffering from a severe food 
shortage in the immediate postwar era. However Turkey could not attain its long­
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term objectives. It failed to contribute to the reorganization of the world economy 
through realize maximum output of goods and service which would led an 
ultimate degree of exchange of goods.
1ABLE-22:_I1IRKEY:S.EXEQRIS_AND_SHARE_0F_WQRLDJ;XPQRT&(JVIILLIQNS_DZ.$)1
YEAR
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
SOURCE:
TURKISH EXPORTS AS A SHARE OF 
_W_ORLD_EXPORIS._ _  __WORLD EXEQRTS_(%)
263
314
363
396
335
313
305
345
247
354
321
347
381
368
411
464
490
523
496
537
588
55.200
74.800
72.400
73.400
76.400 
83.220
92.600
99.300
94.800
100.600
112.600
117.800
124.100
136.100 
152.700
165.400
181.300
190.600 
212.900 
243.500
280.300
0. 47
0. 42
0.50
0.54
0.44
0.38
0.33
0.35
0.26
0.35
0.29
0.29
0.31
0.27
0.27
0.28
0.27
0.27
0.23
0.22
0.21
Turkish and World Exports From luternationaLEinanciaLStatistics,.Various Issues
Table reveals Turkey’s minimum contribution to the exchange of goods.
Between the years 1950 - 1970, Turkey’s share of world exports reached their 
highest levels in 1952-53, the years when there were extraordinary fertile harvests 
and extension in the development of newly cultivated areas reached its peak. The 
fact that by the end of the Korean War ,the U.S. and Canada had begun to market 
their grain and other countries had gradually begun to regain their prewar levels 
of production contributed to the decline of Turkey’s share of world exports. In
' Anne O. Krueger, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Turkey, NY: National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 1974, p.180.
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addition the lower quality and relative higher priced Turkish products could 
hardly compete in international markets.'
In essence Turkey’s low economic performance was not a great surprise or 
an unexpected outcome for the U.S. administration or EGA. Even in the initial 
phases of ERP the U.S. officials made the distinction between Turkey (and 
Greece) and other participating countries. The Turkish program was not 
considered to be a reconstruction program; but a development program. 
According to U.S. policy makers Turkey’s program was ‘ building from scratch; 
not a recovery program, like ERP.^
A statement by George McGhee , American ambassador to Turkey, 
supported the above mentioned belief. McGhee stated that Turkey could not 
really integrate with Europe, due to the immaturity of its system and people for an 
American free enterprise system.:
“There is no basis for integration within Turkey...As much 
integration as possible was attempted under the Marshall Plan 
but the economies of Greece and Turkey were both quite 
different from that of Europe. They had never been so 
industrialized. It was not easy to integrate their economies with 
those of western European countries. There were no real free
' Hershlag, Turkey: An Economy in Transition, p. 216
 ^Interview with Gideon Hadary, Chief of Food & Agriculture Division in Ankara, December 
10,1952,Papers of Harry Price, Oral History Interviews on Marshall Plan,HTR.
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enterprise system in prewar Greece or Turkey corresponding to 
what we had in this country...” '
This was an accurate diagnosis. Integration into the world economy , as the 
ultimate objective of the ‘free’ world recovery program, necessitated a well 
established communication and transportation system which could simultaneously 
transmit changes in world markets; a modern banking system and an efficient 
marketing network overseas. Postwar Turkey lacked these prerequisites.
Turkish political elite had two options for the implementation of the 
development program: either an outward -oriented or an inward- oriented 
economic strategy.^Turkey preferred the latter strategy, import- substitution, for its 
development. In truth, clear cut distinctions between inward and outward 
orientation does not accurately describe the Turkish strategy. A more accurate 
definition might be the existence of export expansion and import substitution 
policies in varying proportions, with long period of import substitution followed 
by short periods of export oriented foreign trade policy. Instead of an evolving 
policy, it was more like a vicious circle, with a retreat to inward- oriented policies 
follovring each unsuccessful attempts at a more liberal strategy. This circular 
motion necessitated a radical break, which occured with the introduction of the 
1980 Economic Stabilization Package.
In a special report regarding the different levels of success in the ERP , and
' Oral History Interview with George McGhee, Assistant Secretary for Near East and Africa then American 
Ambassador in Turkey, June 11,1975, HTR.
 ^ Sanli. Gelişmekte Olan Ülkelerde Liberal Ekonomiye Etkin Gecis Sorunu: Güney Kore, Brezilya & 
Türkiye Deneyimleri., p. 45
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why the expectation of less industrialized countries’ integration to the world 
economy was a utopia in the immediate postwar era was discussed. The report 
stressed that when ERP was launched Europe already had the “basic building 
blocs” for a strong economy: Educated workers; established industries; commercial 
traditions; technical know how; and settled laws. After adding that other societies 
lacked many of these economic necessities, the author concluded that as 
important as U.S. generosity, European capacity was a key determinant of this 
success.^
The Turkish experience confirms the accuracy of this analysis. Turkey had 
the potential, but could not transform this potential into dynamic energy. It 
lacked capital; skilled people; required technological level; commercial traditions; 
and an educated population. Moreover, a well established communication and 
transportation system, efficient marketing network, and modern banking system 
were nonexistent..
Turkey’s attempt to integrate to the world economy commenced in the late 
1940s. Highway improvement and agricultural mechanization were the high 
priority programs established to attain this goal. These programs would be a 
means to better the lot of the overwhelming peasant population; balance the 
improvement of the various branches of national economy. The repercussions of 
these projects, such as commercialization of agriculture, specialization of farming, 
deepening lines of social differentiation; the accelerated momentum of rural and
 ^Robert Samuelson, ‘The Triumph and the Myth’, Newsweek, May 26, 1997, p.21.
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urban unemployment and underemployment; overurbanization; and the creation 
of a dual structure to society indicate how questionable these programs’ success.
When U.S. officials diagnosed the implementation deficiencies. They 
developed some alternative means such as farm cooperatives, or other types of 
farm machines more appropriate to the small land owners, the 82% of the rural 
population to prevent, or at least minimize the negative impacts. Turkey however 
could not implement these alternatives due to various reasons. The planners had 
failed to judge the scale of the negative impact of these programs on Turkish 
society. In 1997 these can be judged more accurately, since the outcomes of these 
projects, whether direct or indirect, have been the “realities” of Turkey, for the 
past fifty years..
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